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ESSAY
RISKY ARGUMENTS IN SOCIAL-JUSTICE LITIGATION:
THE CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
MARRIAGE EQUALITY
Suzanne B. Goldberg*
This Essay takes up the puzzle of the risky argument or, more
precisely, the puzzle of why certain arguments do not get much traction
in advocacy and adjudication even when some judges find them
to be utterly convincing. Through a close examination of the sex-
discrimination argument’s evanescence in contemporary marriage liti-
gation, this Essay draws lessons about how and why arguments become
risky in social-justice cases and whether they should be made nonethe-
less. The marriage context is particularly fruitful because some judges,
advocates, and scholars find it “obviously correct” that laws excluding
same-sex couples from marriage discriminate facially based on sex or
impose sex stereotypes. Yet advocates have tended to minimize these
arguments and most judges either sidestep or go out of their way to
reject them.
Certain kinds of arguments, including the sex-discrimination
argument in marriage cases, turn out to pose greater risks than others
because they ask decisionmakers to confront long-settled social hierar-
chies and norms, such as those associated with gender roles. As a result,
they risk inciting Burkean anxieties about the dangers of nonincremen-
tal change. Arguments that ask less of decisionmakers, such as those
about animus associated with a particular enactment—or that have a
more limited reach, such as heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation
at a time when few explicitly antigay laws remain—are less likely to
provoke that discomfort. Moreover, a win on these narrower arguments
can also erode stereotypes and norms underlying a challenged law or
social policy. In marriage cases, for example, a pro-equality ruling helps
call longstanding marital gender roles into question even if the court’s
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decision never mentions sex discrimination. Still, risky arguments add
value within litigation by powerfully calling attention to deep problems
that underlie a challenged law. Through close study of these costs and
benefits, the risky-argument frame advanced here aims to illuminate the
complex dynamics of argumentation in the litigation and adjudication
of social-justice cases.
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay takes up the puzzle of the risky argument. In the ordinary
course of litigation, advocates present every theory that is likely to per-
suade, and judges choose among them, usually selecting the arguments
that are most compelling without overreaching. But certain theories tend
to recede or disappear from advocates’ submissions and judicial opin-
ions, even though they have proven fully convincing to some decision-
makers. They turn out to have a lightning-rod-like quality; while some
adjudicators find them intensely attractive, others find them repellent. As
a result, marginalizing or ignoring them risks losing their persuasive
power, yet making them risks provoking otherwise dormant opposition.
The Essay’s aim is twofold: first, to theorize about what makes an
argument risky in social-justice cases that seek to end discriminatory prac-
tices and other inequities, and second, to consider how a risky-argument
frame can illuminate the costs and benefits of argumentation choices in
litigation and adjudication.
While every argument in social-justice litigation seeks change on the
ground, usually through ending a harmful practice or enjoining enforce-
ment of a discriminatory law, some go further. These, which I term “risky
arguments,” ask decisionmakers to revisit and unsettle deeply rooted or
widespread social norms or practices. That is, they not only seek a de-
sired practical outcome but also aim to shift a court’s conceptualization
of the problem at issue. Put another way, these arguments take direct aim
at the presence of discrimination in longstanding laws and practices that
tend to be treated, uncritically, as part of the “natural order.” In doing
so, they pose potentially greater risks than their discrete counterparts.
If they succeed, risky arguments have tremendous upside. Rulings
accepting them can often be leveraged to highlight similar discrimina-
tion that has gone unnoticed or been deemed unobjectionable in related
contexts.
But they have downsides, too. Because the alleged discrimination is
so deeply embedded in laws and social practices, these arguments can be
difficult for decisionmakers to grasp and may be ineffective as a result.
Worse, from a risk perspective, is that their direct challenge to natural-
ized views may be experienced as threatening. This is because risky
arguments, as defined here, ask decisionmakers to find that discrimina-
tion is present in generally accepted societal hierarchies (for example,
hierarchies associated with the different social roles and expectations of
men and women—more on this below) or other familiar practices.1
1. Others have written thoughtfully about norm-challenging arguments in
connection with a range of civil-rights movements. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some
Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth
Century, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2062, 2064–65 (2002) (discussing constitutional challenges to
traditional forms of discrimination brought by movements for racial equality, women’s
rights, and gay rights); Kenneth L. Karst, Constitutional Equality as a Cultural Form: The
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By urging conceptual shifts rather than minor tweaks in understand-
ing, these norm-challenging arguments risk inciting decisionmakers’
Burkean anxieties about the dangers of nonincremental change.2 That is,
because they challenge the perceived natural order of things, these argu-
ments risk being seen as destabilizing. For some judges, arguments of this
sort may prompt a ruling adverse to the argument maker. But, and more
interestingly for purposes of this Essay, even those who agree with the
litigant’s ultimate claim may go out of their way to reject or otherwise
disassociate themselves from arguments that directly contest norms
embedded in widespread practices.
A couple of concrete examples from outside the marriage-equality
context may help illustrate this distinction in argument types. A chal-
lenge to the death penalty on the ground that its application to a
particular crime or type of defendant is unconstitutionally cruel, for
example, is relatively narrow and familiar in conceptual scope. Its practi-
cal impact, if accepted, is likewise confined to the particular type of
death-penalty case at hand.3
By contrast, an argument that the death penalty should be enjoined
because the sentencing process is infected by race discrimination would
reach more broadly, both conceptually and practically.4 Conceptually,
the argument would require a court to acknowledge and condemn forms
of bias that are arguably both pervasive and deeply entrenched through-
Courts and the Meanings of Sex and Gender, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 513, 514–15 (2003)
(analyzing the interaction between court decisions and changing social views of women,
lesbians, and gay men); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword:
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8 (2003)
[hereinafter Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution] (“[C]onstitutional law and culture
are locked in a dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in
turn regulates culture.”); see also Robert C. Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 406–30 (2007) (discussing
the relationship between developments in constitutional law and cultural politics
regarding abortion).
2. See Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 259 (J.C.D. Clark ed.,
Stanford Univ. Press 2001) (1790) (outlining the risk associated with changes to long-
settled political structures because “the whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth
would be broken”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 353,
356 (2006) (explaining that “Burkeans insist on incrementalism; but they also emphasize
the need for judges to pay careful heed to established traditions”). For discussion of this
point in connection with theories of judicial minimalism, see infra note 27.
3. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) (invalidating Florida statute
on Eighth Amendment grounds because it unduly restricted evidence of intellectual
disability in death-penalty cases); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005) (barring as
“cruel and unusual” executions of individuals for capital crimes committed before age
eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (forbidding, on “cruel and unusual
punishment” grounds, execution of individuals with “mental retardation”).
4. In McCleskey v. Kemp, for example, the Court rejected this broader type of
challenge, holding that “a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race” did not require
invalidation of Georgia’s death-sentencing process. 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987).
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out the criminal-justice system.5 Practically, a ruling on this ground could
be used to challenge not only imposition of the death penalty but also,
potentially, most other aspects of the criminal-justice process.6 Thus, in
both the intellectual move it demands and in its potential reach, the
race-discrimination argument involves a bigger “ask” and, hence, greater
risk than its more discrete counterpart.
Consider, too, an employment-discrimination suit. A discrete presen-
tation of the case would focus on the set of concrete incidents that led
the plaintiff to seek redress, whether in the form of harassment, com-
ments, or undercompensation.7 Given the proof difficulties associated
with discrimination cases, the same plaintiff might seek to strengthen the
case by also making an argument about implicit bias that gave rise to the
troublesome workplace conduct or lower payscale.8
A favorable ruling based on facts specific to the plaintiff’s case would
resolve that employee’s claim with limited implications for other similar
5. The Court in McCleskey signaled its awareness of the sweep of the race-based equal-
protection challenge. “McCleskey challenges decisions at the heart of the State’s criminal
justice system,” the majority wrote. Id. at 297 (“Because discretion is essential to the
criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer
that the discretion has been abused.”).
For extended discussion of racial bias within the criminal-justice system, see Michelle
Alexander, The New Jim Crow 2 (2010) (“Rather than rely on race [to discriminate], we
use our criminal justice system to label people of color ‘criminals’ and then engage in all
the practices we supposedly left behind . . . . We have not ended racial caste in America;
we have merely redesigned it.”).
6. Cf. Alexander, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing “mass incarceration in the United States
had, in fact, emerged as a stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of
racialized social control”).
7. See, e.g., Hall v. Siemens VDO Auto., 481 F. App’x 499, 501 (11th Cir. 2012)
(recounting plaintiff’s testimony that she received lower compensation than her white
male coworkers); Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182, 185–86 (5th Cir. 2012)
(describing pattern of escalating sexual harassment faced by plaintiff from his coworker);
Risch v. Royal Oak Police Dep’t, 581 F.3d 383, 385–87 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing several
instances where male officers with lower test scores were promoted, while plaintiff was
repeatedly passed over); White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir.
2008) (noting plaintiff’s testimony that his new supervisor made multiple discriminatory
comments based on race). See generally 1 Andrew J. Ruzicho et al., Employment Law
Checklists and Forms § 4:3 (2014), available at Westlaw EMPL-CF (discussing case law that
addresses circumstantial evidence of employment discrimination).
8. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 Yale L.J. 728, 734
n.15 (2011) [hereinafter Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison] (discussing barriers to
discrimination plaintiffs’ success). For extended discussion about implicit bias in
workplaces, see, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 945, 946 (2006) (examining “the science of
implicit cognition,” which “suggests that actors do not always have conscious, intentional
control over the processes of social perception, impression formation, and judgment that
motivate their actions”); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94
Calif. L. Rev. 969, 973 (2006) (discussing how distinctions between intuitive and
deliberative cognitive operations can help “illuminate legal responses to a wide range of
behavioral problems” regarding implicit bias).
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cases. A ruling on implicit-bias grounds, by contrast, would condemn
deeply internalized views and intuitions that, according to many
researchers, pervade most workplaces and other segments of society.9
This too, needless to say, is a far bigger—and riskier—“ask” than is made
by the argument that discriminatory intent can be discerned in the
specific incidents at issue.10
The same dynamic can be seen in challenges to laws that exclude
same-sex couples from marriage or refuse to recognize those couples’
existing marriages (together, the “marriage bans”), which serve as the
case study for this Essay’s extended exploration of risky arguments. In
litigation against these bans, two relatively discrete equality arguments
feature most prominently11 and have proven most likely to prevail. The
9. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 8, at 955 (demonstrating that “implicit
attitude measures reveal far more bias favoring advantaged groups than do explicit
measures”); see also Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 481, 483–86 (2005) (summarizing
several empirical studies showing “unconscious bias is quite prevalent, often in sharp
contrast to individuals’ self-professed identity”).
10. See Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious Discrimination:
Firm-Based Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 347, 373
(2008) (“[J]udges also struggle with determining an appropriate remedy for victims of
unconscious discrimination that reflects the proper distribution of liability, without
causing the employer to engage in behavior that is both costly and overly deterrent.”). See
generally Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, supra note 8, at 791–802 (discussing
courts’ reluctance to embrace sociological or nonfalsifiable evidence regarding workplace
conduct).
A broader issue here is that courts tend to avoid arguments based on evidence that is
not easily visible for reasons of institutional competence and legitimacy, among others.
See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social
Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 Or. L. Rev. 629 (2002).
11. Outside of litigation, supporters of marriage equality often make broad fairness
arguments as well. See, e.g., David Blankenhorn, Op-Ed, How My View on Gay Marriage
Changed, N.Y. Times (June 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/
how-my-view-on-gay-marriage-changed.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“Whatever one’s definition of marriage, legally recognizing gay and lesbian couples and
their children is a victory for basic fairness.”); Lincoln Chafee, Gay Marriage: A Question
of Fairness, Huffington Post (June 19, 2009, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
lincoln-chafee/gay-marriage-a-question-o_b_217389.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“To me, the issue of same-sex marriage boils down to a question of basic
fairness.”).
They do not tend to argue, however, that marriage bans discriminate based on sex.
This inattention to the sex-discrimination argument in public debates can likely be
explained by reasons similar to those explored in this Essay, though development of this
point is beyond the scope here. For illustrations of the sex-discrimination argument’s
infrequent invocation in nonlitigation settings, see, e.g., infra note 24 (discussing
legislators and professors who affirm the sex-discrimination argument).
For discussion of the link between the sex-discrimination argument and marriage
equality for same-sex couples in public debates of earlier decades, particularly related to
the Equal Rights Amendment, see Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 Calif. L.
Rev. 1323, 1400–02 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional Culture].
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first is that marriage bans discriminate unconstitutionally based on sexual
orientation. The second is that the bans impermissibly target a group of
people for an unfair burden (the “antitargeting” argument) and, as
such, constitute “[d]iscrimination[] of an unusual character.”12
As will be discussed at length below, the equal-protection argument
that focuses on sexual-orientation discrimination is conceptually discrete.
Most people understand that the bans primarily affect gay people who
want to marry their same-sex partners (disagreement exists only
regarding whether the bans are permissible).13 The reach of a ruling that
marriage bans discriminate impermissibly based on sexual orientation is
relatively limited, too, given that few remaining laws or policies
discriminate in this way.14
The antitargeting argument is also conceptually discrete. It focuses
on the bans’ enactment in response to the prospect of gay and lesbian
couples marrying15 and asks the decisionmaker to discern discrimination
12. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (first alteration in original) (quoting
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37–38 (1928)). Romer, the
contemporary cornerstone of the antitargeting argument, rejected a state constitutional
amendment because it placed a unique legal burden on the ability of lesbians, gay men,
and bisexuals to obtain antidiscrimination protections. For Romer’s antitargeting
predecessors, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985)
(invalidating zoning ordinance that imposed targeted restrictions on housing for people
with mental retardation); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973)
(invalidating food-stamp regulation targeted at hippies).
Another frequently made argument, grounded in the due-process guarantee, urges
that laws preventing individuals from marrying their same-sex partner or denying
recognition to those marriages violate the fundamental right to marry. See infra note 50
and accompanying text (detailing argument and giving various examples).
13. Even Charles Cooper, who defended California’s Proposition 8, recognized the
exclusion of same-sex couples as discrimination based on sexual orientation, as he argued,
in response to a question by Justice Kennedy, that the measure did not discriminate based
on sex. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) (No. 12-144) [hereinafter Hollingsworth Transcript], available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-144a.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“[W]e agree that to the extent that the classification impacts, as it
clearly does, same-sex couples, that—that classification can be viewed as one of sexual
orientation rather than [sex].”).
14. Many laws that discriminate based on sexual orientation have recently been
overturned. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Statement by
the President on the Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (Sept. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/20/statement-president-repeal-
dont-ask-dont-tell (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (announcing formal repeal of
“discriminatory law known as Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”). However, some laws and policies
remain that, in their contexts, discriminate directly based on sexual orientation. See, e.g.,
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-3(5) (2013) (“Adoption by couples of the same gender is
prohibited.”); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-117(3) (LexisNexis 2012) (“A child may not be
adopted by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and
binding marriage under the laws of this state.”).
15. See infra note 53 (discussing “defense of marriage” acts passed after the Hawaii
Supreme Court declined to dismiss a lawsuit brought by same-sex couples seeking
marriage rights).
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directly from the facts surrounding the enactment and related laws. Its
context-specific focus means, too, that a favorable ruling will not
translate seamlessly to other kinds of cases.
By contrast, the sex-discrimination argument presents a bigger
conceptual ask.16 To find sex discrimination, a judge must both see and
condemn sex-based distinctions and stereotyping embedded in the
different-sex marriage requirement.17 But while many people recognize
the bans’ negative effects on gay people, relatively few perceive sex
discrimination in the same rules. This low level of recognition, together
with (and perhaps reinforced by) the requirement’s longstanding nature
and the fact that most married judges have different-sex spouses and
many may be in marriages that they see as egalitarian, heightens the chal-
lenge of persuading decisionmakers to recognize the presence of sex
discrimination in the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.18
Moreover, a sex-discrimination ruling would likely reach more
broadly than a ruling based on sexual-orientation discrimination or an
antitargeting theory because numerous officially and socially sanctioned
distinctions based on sex remain in force.19 There is no obvious reason
that a favorable marriage ruling on sex discrimination would not also call
some or all of these other distinctions into question. Consequently, the
sex-discrimination argument in marriage litigation has the possibility of
both the payoff and the downsides that characterize risky arguments.
The next question, then, is whether the risks outweigh the benefits
of making, and possibly winning, a case with a broad, norm-challenging
theory. This Essay concludes that they sometimes do, though with
important qualifications as developed below. My central claim on this
point, which is more descriptive than normative, is that a discrete
argument has the potential to accomplish much of what the norm-
challenging argument seeks, without the costs of that argument. This is
because a favorable ruling in a social-justice case, regardless of its under-
lying reasoning, will erode a law or social policy that bolstered the
naturalness of the challenged distinction.
16. To be sure, a lawsuit demanding that a state recognize same-sex couples’
marriages is itself relatively risky as compared to litigation challenging the federal govern-
ment’s Defense of Marriage Act because regulating marriage is usually the province of the
states, not the federal government. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691
(2013) (“[T]he Federal Government, through our history, has deferred to state-law policy
decisions with respect to domestic relations.”). But this is separate from the question
whether the legal theories advanced in a given lawsuit are conceptually discrete or are
more broadly, and riskily, norm challenging.
17. For elaboration of these two sex-discrimination theories, see infra Part I.A–B.
18. See infra Part IV.B (exploring doctrinal barriers to the sex-discrimination
argument, including case law on dress codes and parenting); Part IV.D (offering a
psychosocial explanation for judicial reluctance to accept sex-discrimination arguments).
19. See infra note 170 (discussing social norms regarding different-sex bathrooms);
see also infra note 158 (discussing pervasive, popular beliefs in essential differences
between men and women).
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In other words, a ruling can undermine stereotypes and conventions
without relying on, or even mentioning, a theory that directly confronts
them.20 There are other benefits of sidestepping the “big” argument, too,
including reducing the likelihood of alienating potential allies and the
risk of a broadly damaging loss. Of course, there are also costs associated
with not making these arguments, which this Essay will detail as well.21
A few more general observations are needed before turning to
explore in depth the sex-discrimination argument in marriage cases
through the lens of the risky-argument theory. First, while any number of
arguments might seek to expand judicial understandings of discrimi-
nation, this Essay’s interest is in those that have already been accepted by
audiences beyond their proponents and close allies. That is, the
arguments must have been deemed plausible by some courts, have
serious empirical support, or have some other indicia of mainstream
acceptance. This is not to suggest that all previously unembraced argu-
ments lack value. Rather, my aim here is to understand why certain
arguments do not get much traction, either among advocates or judges,
even after they have proven to be persuasive.
By looking at arguments with demonstrated plausibility, we can start
to see that some arguments are disfavored or disregarded by advocates,
or rejected by judges, not because they are unpersuasive but rather for
reasons related to the confrontation they seek with the status quo. It is
this confrontation that makes them riskier or less appealing than other
available arguments. Yet because they appeal to some, there is risk not
only in making them, but also in sidestepping them.
The marriage-equality context is particularly interesting in this vein.
On the one hand, the sex-discrimination argument is “obviously correct”
to some judges,22 scholars,23 and others.24 Indeed, it may persuade deci-
20. See infra Part VI.B (discussing high impact of discrete-argument wins in marriage
cases).
21. One qualification is important here. Advocates often decline to make arguments
that will cut against their broader goals in ways that might harm other clients. The risky
arguments discussed here do not fall into this category for the reasons explained below.
22. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, Nos. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at
*15 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring) (“[T]he same-sex marriage
prohibitions, if anything, classify more obviously on the basis of sex than they do on the
basis of sexual orientation . . . .”); see also infra text accompanying notes 53–68 (discussing
judicial decisions endorsing the sex-discrimination argument).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 80–84 (discussing scholarly support for the
sex-discrimination argument).
24. See Conn. Senate Judiciary Comm., Reports on Bills Favorably Reported by
Committee: An Act Concerning Marriage Equality, S.B. 963 (2005), available at http://
www.cga.ct.gov/2005/jfr/s/2005SB-00963-R00JUD-JFR.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (quoting law professors Ian Ayres and Jennifer Brown as supporting Connecticut
bill to legalize marriage for same-sex couples because “Connecticut should end the sex
discrimination in the law”); Phil Reese, Kaine, Two More U.S. Senators Back Marriage
Equality, Wash. Blade (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2013/03/26/
kaine-two-more-u-s-senators-back-same-sex-marriage (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
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sionmakers who are otherwise unmoved or reluctant to embrace anti-
targeting or sexual-orientation-discrimination arguments. It may also be
a valuable “atmospheric” argument that, while not ultimately adopted,
helps a decisionmaker along in finding fault with the challenged law.25 At
the same time, it is also obviously incorrect to others and, at times,
provocatively so. Some judges who rule for marriage equality on other
grounds and, therefore, do not need to address the sex-discrimination
argument at all will nonetheless make a point of explaining why they
reject it.26 In this way, there is peril both in making and in avoiding or
marginalizing the argument.
This inescapable risk helps explain why one cannot simply dismiss
risky arguments as antiminimalist and, therefore, not worth making. As
Cass Sunstein wrote, within a broader exploration of judicial minimalism,
courts “generally try to avoid issues of basic principles” in cases with high
societal stakes.27 Yet it will sometimes be the case, perhaps especially in
social-justice cases, that what makes a particular argument nonminimalist
is in the eye of the beholder. Arguments that one judge sees as entailing
a measurable societal shift may be seen by another judge as narrow or
necessary to reach a litigant’s desired outcome.
Further, the risky-argument frame helps clarify that the set of
“minimalist” arguments in a given context is also not fixed. What
constitutes a basic principle that might best be avoided, per Sunstein, will
change over time, depending on shifts in surrounding law and social
(quoting Senator Jay Rockefeller as supporting marriage rights for same-sex couples
because “government shouldn’t discriminate against people who want to marry just
because of their gender”).
25. The argument can help illuminate why certain proffered justifications, such as
the state’s interest in children having both male and female parents, are laden with sex
stereotypes. See infra notes 189–190 and accompanying text (discussing the use of sex-
discrimination argument to expose impermissible gender-role stereotypes).
26. See infra notes 101–108 and accompanying text (discussing rulings in which
courts granted litigants’ marriage-equality claim and rejected the sex-discrimination
argument rather than leaving it unaddressed).
27. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 20 (1996) (describing “incompletely theorized
agreements” as one goal of judicial minimalists (emphasis omitted)). Social-change cases
will often fit Sunstein’s characterization as involving issues “of high complexity about
which many people feel deeply and on which the nation is in flux (moral or otherwise).”
Id. at 8. For these kinds of cases, Sunstein suggests that “minimalism makes sense first
because courts may resolve the relevant issues incorrectly, and second because courts may
be ineffective or create serious problems even if their answers are right.” Id. Consequently,
he argues, “[c]ourts should try to economize on moral disagreement by refusing to
challenge other people’s deeply held moral commitments when it is not necessary for
them to do so.” Id.
The focus here is not so much on the normative justifications for or the desirability of
judicial minimalism, but on the second-order reasons why some arguments come to be
seen as “bigger” and therefore less minimalist and more threatening than others.
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norms. In other words, an argument that is minimalist at one time might
be seen as much less so at another.28
This is certainly the case in marriage litigation. As discussed below,
arguments about sexual-orientation discrimination might once have
been seen as risky because of their implications for other sexual-
orientation-based laws and because of prevailing norms that supported
inequality for gay people.29 Yet these same arguments have undergone a
status shift and, arguably, have become minimalist in an environment
where legal enforcement of sexual-orientation discrimination is increas-
ingly disdained.30 Similarly, arguments that bans related to same-sex
couples’ marriages engage in impermissible targeting and amount to
discrimination of an unusual character (the argument the Supreme
Court accepted in United States v. Windsor 31) have also become more
minimalist since the Court decided, in Romer v. Evans, to apply our
constitutional tradition of concern in this regard to an antigay measure.
The remainder of the Essay explores, through the risky-argument
frame advanced here, why the sex-discrimination argument has not
gotten much traction in marriage cases and what broader consequences
may flow from this risky-argument avoidance. On this point, particular
consideration goes to the sex-discrimination argument’s synergies with
28. In Jack Balkin’s terms, this would be the shift when an argument moves from
being “off-the-wall” to “on-the-wall.” Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption 12, 177–
83 (2011). In a similar vein, Justice Ginsburg invoked Paul Freund’s observation that
judges “are affected, not by the weather of the day . . . but by the climate of the era” to
explain courts’ growing amenability to women’s rights claims in the 1970s. Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means of Advancing the
Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 263, 268 (1997). She
added:
Supreme Court Justices, and lower court judges as well, were becoming aware of
a sea change in United States society. Their enlightenment was advanced
publicly by the briefs filed in Court and privately, I suspect, by the aspirations of
the women, particularly the daughters and granddaughters, in their own families
and communities.
Id. at 268–69.
For a discussion of the process by which changed understandings of a social group
are incorporated into legal doctrine, see generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional
Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 Colum. L.
Rev. 1955 (2006).
29. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (sustaining Georgia’s sodomy
law based on “majority sentiment about the morality of homosexuality”); id. at 196–97
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (stating that “[d]ecisions of individuals relating to homosexual
conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western
civilization” based on “millennia of moral teaching”).
30. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating Texas’s
“homosexual conduct” law, overruling Bowers, and concluding that the gay litigants were
“entitled to respect for their private lives”).
31. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
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narrower or more minimalist arguments that may contribute to litigation
success even when courts do not take up the argument directly.32
To set a foundation for the discussion that follows, Part I offers a
primer on the sex-discrimination argument and other legal theories pre-
sented in marriage-equality cases. Part II then elaborates the enthusiastic
judicial and scholarly embrace that the sex-discrimination argument has
received in some quarters. As Part III shows, however, most judges have
ignored the argument, including in Windsor, and some judges and
scholars have made a special point of rejecting it even when they grant
marriage-equality claims.
Part IV then tracks several possible explanations for the sex-
discrimination argument’s evanescence in marriage litigation. These
include practical reasons related to word limits and judicial attention
spans; broader reasons associated with doctrine and social-movement
strategy; and psychosocial explanations related to the advocates and
judges who decide whether and how to address the arguments.
Part V uses the risky-argument frame to show that courts may also
resist the sex-discrimination argument because of inchoate beliefs that
adopting the argument will produce undesirable shifts in social norms
and relations. Building on earlier observations, Part VI explores the role
that risky arguments play in litigation even when they do not receive
judicial uptake. In particular, this Part considers the synergies between
32. Although the sex-discrimination argument can be both useful and effective, as
the discussion below shows, this Essay does not develop that position at length here.
Instead, it focuses on the potential risks associated with the argument in an effort to
understand its limited uptake.
For thoughtful development of the sex-discrimination argument’s benefits in
litigation and policy debates, see, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action?
Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 97,
125–34 (2005) (arguing that “add[ing] explicit gender talk to the public conversation . . .
will both expose and answer the reliance on implicit gender talk by same-sex marriage
opponents”); Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional
Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1447, 1486–90
(2000) [hereinafter Case, The Very Stereotype] (“[T]o strike down a ban on same-sex
marriage on equal protection grounds as violative of norms against sex discrimination
rather than on substantive due process grounds as violative of guarantees of associational
privacy and family autonomy, is in many respects the more conservative, more easily
limited decision.”); Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage
Litigation, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1199, 1221 (2010) [hereinafter Case, What Feminists Have to
Lose] (explaining that the sex-discrimination argument’s focus on stereotyping “obviates
the necessity of forcing individuals into well-defined rigid groups to whose standards they
must conform—gay or straight, male or female, masculine or feminine—as a precondition
for vindicating their rights”); Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas
NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 Harv.
J.L. & Gender 461, 479–87 (2007) (observing that “grounding the facial sex discrimination
argument in a substantive discussion of the sex stereotypes at play can make the sex
discrimination caused by the use of sex-based classifications in the marriage statutes much
more real” because “sex stereotypes continue to have significant currency today”
(emphasis omitted)).
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risky and more discrete or incremental arguments, and the benefits those
synergies might produce for litigants in social-change cases.
I. A PRIMER ON THE SEX-DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT ANDOTHER LEGAL
THEORIES INMARRIAGE CASES
The sex-discrimination argument in marriage cases has two
dimensions—one focused on formal equality and the other on sex
stereotyping. This Part discusses how each is presented by advocates and
sets the foundation for discussion to come about the sex-discrimination
argument’s lack of traction and its various costs and benefits. To put the
sex-discrimination argument in context, this Part will also briefly address
how the sexual-orientation and antitargeting equality arguments and the
fundamental-rights due process argument are framed in marriage cases.
A. The Formal-Equality Argument
First, and most popular among litigators and judges,33 is the formal-
equality argument, which focuses on facial discrimination. Here, the
claim is that a law authorizing a man to marry a woman but not to marry
a man (and a woman to marry a man but not a woman) is discriminatory
per se based on the category of sex. Put another way, a rule that limits
marriage to different-sex couples hinges eligibility on the sex of one’s
partner. According to the formal-equality argument, this kind of sex-
based eligibility rule is, by definition, discrimination based on sex.
When litigators include this equal-protection argument in their
complaints, they frame it in similarly simple terms. In the first successful
challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Gill v. Office of
Personnel Management, the complaint alleged:
[I]f Keith were married to a woman, not a man, he would be
entitled to the issuance of a United States passport in his legal
surname after marriage upon presenting a copy of the marriage
certificate to the State Department. Because of DOMA . . . Keith
was treated differently from a similarly situated person married
to an individual of a different sex.34
Likewise, in the challenge to California’s Proposition 8, while the
complaint focused primarily on sexual-orientation discrimination, it
33. The academic literature, by contrast, has given the antistereotyping argument
greater attention. See supra note 32 (referencing scholarly discussion of sex-
discrimination argument’s benefits); see also infra note 38 (highlighting additional
scholarly treatment of the sex-stereotyping argument).
34. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief & for Review of Agency
Action at 84, Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 09-
10309-JLT), available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-v-office-of-person
nel-management/gill-complaint-03-03-09.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
For an extended discussion of plaintiffs’ litigation strategies in marriage-ban cases,
including discussion of how the arguments are characterized in briefs, see Widiss et al.,
supra note 32, at 464–75.
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added an equal-protection count to make the formal sex-discrimination
argument:
Prop. 8 also violates the Equal Protection Clause because it
discriminates on the basis of sex. It distinguishes between
couples consisting of a man and a woman and couples
consisting of individuals of the same sex. Thus, the limitation
on civil marriage depends upon an individual person’s sex; a
man who wishes to marry a man may not do so because he is a
man, and a woman may not marry a woman because she is a
woman.35
Still other complaints present claims of sex- and sexual-orientation
discrimination together, as in this DOMA challenge to the federal
government’s refusal to grant health benefits to an employee with a
same-sex spouse: “If Ms. Golinski were a man, . . . [she] would be able to
add her spouse to her existing family plan at no additional cost to her.
Similarly situated heterosexual employees in Ms. Golinski’s position rou-
tinely receive this significant benefit as a matter of course.”36
B. The Sex-Stereotyping Argument
The other version of the sex-discrimination argument focuses on sex
stereotyping. Here the claim is that by restricting marriage to different-
sex couples, a state is presuming—or insisting—that men and women
perform different roles in marriage and that the different roles are
rooted in their maleness and femaleness.37 If a marriage law intentionally
instantiates a sex-role difference, the law then conflicts with settled equal-
protection jurisprudence that governments may not enforce rules based
on gender stereotypes.38 And if a state denies that it seeks to enforce sex
35. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief at 9, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671
F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.
Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 3:09-cv-02292-VRW) [hereinafter Perry Complaint], 2009 WL
1490740.
36. Second Amended Complaint at 4, Golinski v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp.
2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 3:10-cv-0257-JSW), 2011 WL 1481482.
37. For historical discussion of marriage’s different role assignments for men and
women, see generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, A Historical Guide to the Future of Marriage
for Same-Sex Couples, 15 Colum. J. Gender & L. 249, 249–53 (2006) (describing the way
in which “misconceptions of marriage’s history have played such an important part in
justifying the male–female marriage eligibility requirement”).
38. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130–31, 139 (1994)
(rejecting “gross generalizations” based on sex and discrimination that “serve[] to ratify
and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of
men and women”). For further discussion of this argument in legal scholarship, see, e.g.,
Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 32, at 1221 (arguing “antidifferentiation or
antistereotyping view” is “an independently important guarantee of liberty”); Edward
Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA
L. Rev. 471, 498 (2001) (“The sociological claim is that laws that discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation disadvantage women as well as lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals
because these laws perpetuate a social system in which women play different social roles
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roles in this way, then the law allowing marriage only to male–female
pairs would be impermissibly arbitrary.
In litigation, this version of the sex-discrimination argument tends to
be presented simplistically in complaints,39 if at all, with a framing along
the same conceptual lines as the formal-equality argument. In a chal-
lenge to Nevada’s marriage restriction, for example, the complaint assert-
ed that “the State’s marriage ban serves the impermissible purpose of
blocking departures from sex stereotypes by excluding each Plaintiff
from marriage . . . because Plaintiffs fail to conform to the prevailing and
State-enforced stereotype that men should marry women and that
women should marry men.”40 There is opportunity to develop the argu-
than men. The theoretical claim is that these laws are justified by sexism.”); see also infra
notes 83–84 and accompanying text (discussing link between sexuality-based and gender-
based discrimination).
39. Complaints often present a reduced version of a complex argument. In large
part, this is because the litigation function of the complaint is to set out sufficient facts to
overcome a motion to dismiss, if one is made, and to provide a framework for discovery.
After the motion-to-dismiss phase of litigation has passed, the complaint is typically no
longer the centerpiece of the litigation; focus turns instead to evidence gained through
discovery and to the lawyers’ briefs and elaborated arguments in subsequent motions.
Compare, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (placing complaint’s allegations as central concern
in motion to dismiss), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (focusing the dispositive summary-
judgment motion on pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and
affidavits, rather than on the complaint’s allegations).
In much litigation, however, including social-justice cases, complaints go beyond the
bare minimum required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and focus on telling a
particular advocacy story. For a broader discussion of advocacy through complaint
drafting, see Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights
Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 768–72 (1995) (emphasizing “persuasiveness of the stories”
civil-rights lawyers can tell on behalf of their clients through the complaint).
40. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 28, Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F.
Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012) (No. 2:12-cv-00578-RCJ-PAL), 2012 WL 1190622; see also,
e.g., Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 30, Darby v. Orr, No. 12CH19718
(Ill. Cir. Ct. May 30, 2012), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/
darby_il_20120530_complaint-declaratory-injunctive-relief.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (“[T]he State’s marriage ban serves the impermissible purpose of blocking
departures from sex stereotypes . . . .”); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at
31, Lazaro v. Orr, No. 12CH19719 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 30, 2012), 2012 WL 1941374 (asserting
that restrictions on same-sex couples’ marriage “on the basis of stereotype” constitutes sex
discrimination).
Although this type of presentation closely tracks the formal-discrimination argument,
some courts react to stereotyping claims as though they are relatively complex. A federal
district court in Wisconsin, for example, described the stereotyping argument as “more
nuanced” than the “straightforward” facial-discrimination theory. Wolf v. Walker, 986 F.
Supp. 2d 982, 1007 (W.D. Wis.), aff’d sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, No. 14-278, 2014 WL 4425163 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014). The plaintiffs had briefed
their stereotyping theory by arguing that the denial of marriage to same-sex couples
“perpetuates and enforces stereotypes regarding the expected and traditional roles of men
and women, namely that men marry and create families with women, and women marry
and create families with men.” Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment at 18, Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (No. 3:14-cv-00064-bbc), 2014 WL
2572131.
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ment more extensively in briefing, and amicus briefs in contemporary
marriage litigation often do that.41 But the parties’ briefs typically do
not,42 and it is those briefs that signal the litigants’ priorities to the court.
C. Additional Arguments: Sexual-Orientation Discrimination, Antitargeting,
and Fundamental Rights
Complaints and briefs challenging marriage bans have typically led
with a simply framed sexual-orientation-discrimination argument rather
than either version of the sex-discrimination argument just described.
The Windsor complaint, for example, included only one count, which
41. See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of the National Women’s Law Center et al. in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees & Affirmance at 14–21, DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341,
2014 WL 5748990 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014) [hereinafter NWLC Tanco Brief], available at
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Tanco-Brief-June-2014.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (developing the argument that “[l]aws that classify
based on sexual orientation typically share with laws that discriminate based on sex a
foundation in gender stereotypes”). Similar briefs have been filed on appeal in numerous
other challenges to state bans on marriage and on marriage recognition for same-sex
couples. See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of the National Women’s Law Center et al. in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees & Affirmance at 14–21, Baskin v. Zoeller, No. 14-2386 (7th
Cir. Aug. 5, 2014) [hereinafter NWLC Baskin Brief], available at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/cx_ab_marriage_equality_20140805.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (making arguments nearly identical to those in
National Women’s Law Center’s amicus brief filed in Tanco).
42. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 29–35, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 648742 (arguing for heightened scrutiny based on the
challenged measure’s sexual-orientation classification and omitting a sex-discrimination
claim). But see, e.g., Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 23–
27, Harris v. McDonnell, 988 F. Supp. 2d 603 (W.D. Va. 2013) (No. 5:13-cv-00077)
[hereinafter Harris Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Brief], available at
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/50.2_-_brief_in_support_of_pls_motion_
for_summary_judgment_-_9.30.13.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing for
heightened scrutiny of Virginia’s marriage bans not only because of the sexual-orientation-
based classification but also because “they classify explicitly based on gender, and they
reflect stereotyped notions of the proper role of men and women in the marital and family
contexts”). For more detailed discussion of litigants’ lower-court briefing of the sex-
discrimination argument in the pre-Windsor context, see Widiss et al., supra note 32, at
464–73.
In Edith Windsor’s case, the sex-discrimination argument was absent from the
complaint, see infra note 43, and much of the litigation. It arose only in a footnote in
Windsor’s Supreme Court brief, though not as an affirmative argument. Instead, the brief
noted the defendant-intervenor Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group’s “curious suggestion
that DOMA ‘does not classify based on a married couple’s sexual orientation,’ because it is
theoretically possible that a man and a woman, each of whom is gay, would marry each
other and be treated as married.” Brief on the Merits for Respondent Edith Schlain
Windsor at 18 n.2, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307)
[hereinafter Windsor Respondent’s Merits Brief], available at http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/12-307_resp_meri
ts.authcheckdam.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Windsor’s lawyers wrote that
“[i]f the Court were to accept that reading of DOMA . . . then DOMA would constitute sex
discrimination.” Id.
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characterized the injury exclusively in terms of sexual orientation:
“Because the federal government defers to New York’s determination of
who is married for all married couples in New York except married same-
sex couples, DOMA discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.”43
Other complaints present the claim in comparable terms. In a Texas
suit, for example, the complaint alleged: “By explicitly denying civil mar-
riage to same-sex couples, Texas’s ban on same-sex marriage discrimi-
nates on the basis of sexual orientation.”44 A marriage lawsuit in Virginia
made essentially the same assertion: “By purposefully denying civil
marriage to gay and lesbian individuals, Virginia’s ban on same-sex
marriage discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.”45
Some complaints also present a separate antitargeting count,
derived from Romer and related cases, that governments may not target a
group based on popular hostility or disapproval.46 In the Texas com-
plaint, the argument took this form: “The disadvantage Texas imposes
on same-sex couples is the result of disapproval or animus against a
politically unpopular group.”47 Likewise, in Utah, the complaint alleged:
Amendment 3 and the Marriage Discrimination Statutes
“place[] the force of law behind stigmas against gay men and
lesbians, including: gay men and lesbians do not have intimate
relationships similar to heterosexual couples; gay men and
43. Amended Complaint at 21, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394
(S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 10 Civ.
8435 (BSJ)(JCF)), 2011 WL 1302444. This Essay returns to the costs and benefits of the
decision to leave out the sex-discrimination argument in Part VI.
44. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 14, De Leon
v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 5:13-cv-982) [hereinafter De Leon
Complaint], 2013 WL 5969882.
45. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive & Other Relief at 9, Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F.
Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va.), aff’d sub nom. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, No. 14-225, 2014 WL 4230092 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 2:13cv935), 2013 WL
4050615.
46. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (“[L]aws of [this] kind . . . raise
the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected . . . [which offends] conventional and venerable [principles].”);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (rejecting “mere
negative attitudes” or “fear” as grounds for singling out a group for burdensome
regulation); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (concluding equal-
protection guarantee “must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm
a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest” to justify
disparate treatment of that group); see also supra note 31 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court’s acceptance of the antitargeting argument in Windsor).
Russell Robinson has offered a thoughtful critique of the linkage among these three cases,
while situating them more broadly in the Court’s current equal-protection jurisprudence.
Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 67 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015)
(manuscript at 9–15, 26–27), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2476714 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
47. De Leon Complaint, supra note 44, at 14.
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lesbians are not as good as heterosexuals; and gay and lesbian
relationships do not deserve the full recognition of society.”48
And in California, the Perry complaint advanced the antitargeting argu-
ment in this way: “The disadvantage Prop. 8 imposes upon gays and
lesbians is the result of disapproval or animus against a politically
unpopular group.”49
Finally, most complaints also include an allegation that denying
marriage to same-sex couples infringes the right to marry, which the
Supreme Court has long recognized as fundamental.50 In Kentucky, for
example, the plaintiffs’ complaint asserted that “Kentucky law denies the
Plaintiff couple and other same-sex couples this fundamental right by
denying them access to the state-recognized institution of marriage and
refusing to recognize the marriages they entered into in other states and
countries.”51 The fundamental-rights claim in the Perry complaint was
similar: “Prop. 8 impinges on fundamental liberties by denying gay and
lesbian individuals the opportunity to marry civilly and enter into the
same officially sanctioned family relationship with their loved ones as
opposite-sex individuals.”52
II. EMBRACING THE SEX-DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT
Before investigating the sex-discrimination argument’s limited
traction in marriage cases, it is important to see that the argument
receives sufficient judicial uptake to make the inquiry worthwhile. Here, I
discuss judicial acceptance of the formal-equality version of the sex-
48. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 13–14, Kitchen v. Herbert, 961
F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 14-
124, 2014 WL 3841263 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 2:13-cv-00217-RJS) (quoting Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown,
671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)), 2013 WL 1287377.
49. Perry Complaint, supra note 35, at 9.
50. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (explaining that “our past
decisions make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental importance” and the
“freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967))). The Fourth Circuit recently accepted the fundamental-right-to-marry argument
advanced by the litigants. See Bostic, 760 F.3d at 376 (“[W]e conclude that the
fundamental right to marry encompasses the right to same-sex marriage . . . .”); see also
Latta v. Otter, Nos. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at *11–*13 (9th Cir.
Oct. 7, 2014) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (stating that “the fundamental right to marriage,
repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court . . . is properly understood as including the
right to marry an individual of one’s choice” and “that right applies to same-sex marriage
just as it does to opposite-sex marriage”).
51. Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief para. 88, Bourke v.
Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky.), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341,
2014 WL 5748990 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014) (No. 3:13-cv-00750-JGH), 2013 WL 4701355.
52. Perry Complaint, supra note 35, at 8.
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discrimination argument first and then turn to courts’ embrace of the
sex-stereotyping theory.
A. The Promise of Formal Equality
The formal-equality argument began with great promise in marriage
litigation, as it carried the day in the very first appellate decision in the
United States to recognize that excluding same-sex couples from mar-
riage could be unconstitutional.53 A plurality of the Hawaii Supreme
Court in Baehr v. Lewin held that the plaintiff couples had stated a sex-
discrimination claim on which relief could be granted and deemed the
issue to be an easy one.54 “[O]n its face and as applied,” the court wrote,
the challenged Hawaii marriage law “regulates access to the marital
53. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). It was the Hawaii Supreme Court’s
ruling, based on the state’s Equal Rights Amendment, that prompted Congress to enact
the Defense of Marriage Act at the federal level and prompted states to enact similar
legislation in their own jurisdictions. Hawaii, Freedom to Marry, http://www.freedomto
marry.org/states/entry/c/hawaii (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Sept.
18, 2014) (outlining history of same-sex couples’ marriage-recognition efforts in Hawaii).
Hawaii voters amended the state constitution to ban same-sex couples from marrying
before the case was finally decided. Id. In late 2013, the legislature reversed course and
recognized marriage rights for same-sex couples. Id.
A Maryland trial court reached a similar conclusion over a decade later based on
Maryland’s Equal Rights Amendment, though its analysis was rejected by the state supreme
court. Deane v. Conaway, No. 24-C-04-005390, 2006 WL 148145, at *3 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20,
2006) (“The relative genders of the two individuals . . . lie at the very center of the matter;
those whose genders are the same as their intended spouses may not marry, but those
whose genders are different from their intended spouses may. This Court, therefore,
concludes that [the marriage ban] discriminates based on gender.”), rev’d, 932 A.2d 571
(Md. 2007).
Baehr helped to initiate a second wave of marriage litigation and legislative advocacy
efforts on behalf of same-sex couples in the United States. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the
United States, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 275, 281 (2013) [hereinafter Eskridge, Backlash Politics]
(“Inspired by the Hawaii litigation’s vision of marriage equality, gay marriage activists in
other states engaged in more clever institutional strategies and enjoyed greater public
attention to the increasing number of committed lesbian and gay couples . . . .”).
In the first wave, litigant couples uniformly lost their appeals in rulings that contained
relatively little analysis by comparison to more recent rulings. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (rejecting challenge to marriage law’s exclusion of
gay couples); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (same); DeSanto v.
Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (same); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,
1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (same). For a related typology of developments in marriage
litigation and legislative advocacy, see Eskridge, Backlash Politics, supra, at 279–91
(describing three stages of advocacy related to marriage equality).
54. The Baehr plurality “effectively became the opinion of the court” when a newly
appointed associate justice, Paula Nakamaya, joined a later court order clarifying the
original plurality opinion. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and
Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197, 205 (1994) [hereinafter
Koppelman, Sex Discrimination].
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status and its concomitant rights and benefits on the basis of the appli-
cants’ sex. As such, [the statute] establishes a sex-based classification.”55
But the Baehr plurality is not alone in reaching this conclusion.56
Five years later, an Alaska Superior Court judge put the point this way in
recognizing same-sex couples’ right to marry:
That this is a sex-based classification can readily be demon-
strated: if twins, one male and one female, both wished to marry
a woman and otherwise met all of the Code’s requirements,
only gender prevents the twin sister from marrying under the
present law. Sex-based classification can hardly be more
obvious.57
55. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64 (citation omitted). The court described another court’s
earlier rejection of this argument as an “exercise in tortured and conclusory sophistry.” Id.
at 63. In the academic literature, Edward Stein has set out this argument in some detail,
though he ultimately rejects it. See Stein, supra note 38, at 506–15.
56. Although the focus here is on the presence of the sex-discrimination argument in
marriage cases, it bears noting that the argument has been embraced in other contexts
within the United States and in jurisdictions elsewhere as well. For example, within the
United States, in dissent from a state appellate ruling upholding Texas’s “homosexual
conduct” law (later reversed by the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas), one judge
offered this scenario to highlight sex discrimination in a law that singularly burdened
same-sex couples:
There are three people in a room: Alice, Bob, and Cathy. Bob approaches Alice,
and with her consent, engages with her in several varieties of “deviate sexual
intercourse,” the conduct at issue here. Bob then leaves the room. Cathy
approaches Alice, and with her consent, engages with her in several kinds of
“deviate sexual intercourse.” Cathy is promptly arrested for violating [the
statute].
Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 368 (Tex. App. 2001) (Anderson, J., dissenting), rev’d,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
The judge explained that he “indulged in this tableau to demonstrate one important
point: one person simply committed a sex act while another committed a crime. While the
acts were exactly the same, the gender of the actors was different, and it was this difference
alone that determined the criminal nature of the conduct.” Id.; see also, e.g., Heller v.
Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224, 1227 (D. Or. 2002) (finding sex
discrimination when an employer fired a lesbian employee because of her relationship
with a woman because no termination would have occurred if employee had a relationship
with a man); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, ¶¶
8.1–12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D.488/1992 (1994), available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/SDecisionsVol5en.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(deciding that the sex-discrimination prohibition of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights encompassed sexual-orientation discrimination and striking down
Tasmanian laws that criminalized sexual contact between men). But see Case C-249/96,
Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I-621 (rejecting sex-discrimination challenge
to a law that authorized employment benefits to married employees but not to employees
with nonmarital same-sex partners because, in the court’s view, the law treated men and
women equally).
57. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *6
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). The decision was stayed, and Alaska voters later
amended their state constitution to bar marriage rights for same-sex couples. See Alaska
Const. art. I, § 25 (“To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only
between one man and one woman.”).
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Better known is Justice Denise Johnson’s opinion in the Vermont
Supreme Court, where she concluded, regarding Vermont’s different-sex
marriage requirement, that “this is a straightforward case of sex discrim-
ination.”58 Like the Alaska judge, Justice Johnson offered an illustration:
[C]onsider the following example. Dr. A and Dr. B both want to
marry Ms. C, an X-ray technician. Dr. A may do so because Dr. A
is a man. Dr. B may not because Dr. B is a woman. Dr. A and Dr.
B are people of opposite sexes who are similarly situated in the
sense that they both want to marry a person of their choice. The
statute disqualifies Dr. B from marriage solely on the basis of
her sex and treats her differently from Dr. A, a man.59
“This,” she added, “is sex discrimination.”60
Also in the earlier years of marriage litigation, a justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, concurring in that court’s 2003
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health decision to allow marriage for
same-sex couples, declared it “self-evident” that denying those couples
marriage constituted sex discrimination because under the different-sex
eligibility requirement, “an individual’s choice of marital partner is
constrained because of his or her own sex.”61 Across the country, a
Washington Supreme Court justice dissented from the majority’s denial
of marriage rights with this observation in connection with the state’s
Equal Rights Amendment: “[The state’s] DOMA violates the ERA
because it discriminates on the basis of sex. A woman cannot marry the
woman of her choice but a man can marry the woman of his choice.”62
More recently, in what might be called the second wave of same-sex
couples’ marriage cases to engage with the sex-discrimination argu-
ment,63 a federal district court made the same point regarding the
58. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 905 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
59. Id. at 906.
60. Id. Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals wrote similarly:
“Under the Domestic Relations Law, a woman who seeks to marry another woman is
prevented from doing so on account of her sex—that is, because she is not a man. If she
were, she would be given a marriage license to marry that woman.” Hernandez v. Robles,
855 N.E.2d 1, 29 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). A midlevel appellate judge in the
same case took the same position: “[T]he discrimination caused by the challenged statutes
here, on the basis of the parties’ sexual orientation, properly falls within the broader
category of gender discrimination. To illustrate, a woman who seeks to marry another
woman is denied that right because she is not a man.” Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d
354, 385 (App. Div. 2005) (Saxe, J., dissenting) (citation omitted), aff’d, 855 N.E.2d 1.
61. 798 N.E.2d 941, 971 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J., concurring).
62. Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1037 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., dissenting).
63. One can reasonably debate both how many waves best characterize same-sex
couples’ marriage cases and what the start and end point of each wave might be. Cf.
Eskridge, Backlash Politics, supra note 53, at 281 (discussing the progression of marriage
cases). For purposes of thinking about the sex-discrimination argument’s reception, even
though its limited uptake by judges has been fairly steady since Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44 (Haw. 1993), through the present, it seems useful to think about the cases in three
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federal DOMA: “Ms. Golinski is prohibited from marrying . . . a woman,
because [she] is a woman . . . . Thus, DOMA operates to restrict Ms.
Golinski’s access to federal benefits because of her sex.”64 In Perry, Chief
Judge Vaughn Walker engaged the point as well but went further to spell
out the connection between sex and sexual-orientation discrimination:
“[S]ex and sexual orientation are necessarily interrelated, as an
individual’s choice of romantic or intimate partner based on sex is a
large part of what defines an individual’s sexual orientation.”65
basic groups: 1) from the time of Baehr, in which the marriage-equality claim received its
first recognition from an appellate court, through the Vermont Supreme Court ruling that
required equal benefits, but not marriage, for same-sex couples; 2) from Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), as the first ruling to insist on
marriage for same-sex couples to the Supreme Court ruling invalidating DOMA in United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); and 3) the post-Windsor challenges to states’
denial of marriage rights and recognition to same-sex couples, which are ongoing at the
time of publication. Of course, as noted earlier, marriage litigation preceded Baehr as well,
but litigants in those early cases met with no success in court, see supra note 53, so those
cases are less relevant here.
In the first wave, the sex-discrimination argument received prominent, if limited,
endorsement as some judges began tentative forays toward marriage equality. In the
second wave, which saw a mix of victories and losses for same-sex couples seeking marriage
rights, courts’ engagement with the argument continued, though also in a limited way. In
this phase, no one argument had taken hold, suggesting that there was special value in
testing the sex-discrimination argument’s viability along with other equality and
fundamental rights arguments. In the present third wave, the antitargeting argument has
already received Supreme Court endorsement, raising the question whether and how
including a sex-discrimination argument adds value for advocates and decisionmakers. For
an extended analysis of the earliest marriage cases, see, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A
History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1419, 1427–30 (1993) [hereinafter Eskridge,
A History]; see also Scott Barclay & Shauna Fisher, Cause Lawyers in the First Wave of
Same Sex Marriage Litigation, in Cause Lawyers and Social Movements 84, 84–87, 88–89
(Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006). For an in-depth analysis of advocacy
strategies situated in the context of the California marriage cases, see generally Scott L.
Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1235
(2010).
64. Golinksi v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 982 n.4 (N.D. Cal.
2012), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 724 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2013). The court had little
difficulty finding that sex and sexual-orientation discrimination could coexist: “But DOMA
also operates to restrict Ms. Golinski’s access to federal benefits because of her sexual
orientation; her desire to marry another woman arises only because she is a lesbian.
Accordingly, the Court addresses the Equal Protection challenge on the basis of sexual
orientation.” Id.
65. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). Judge Walker also embraced the facial-
discrimination argument. See id. (“Here, for example, Perry is prohibited from marrying
Stier, a woman, because Perry is a woman. If Perry were a man, Proposition 8 would not
prohibit the marriage. Thus, Proposition 8 operates to restrict Perry’s choice of marital
partner because of her sex.”). Based on the interrelation between sex and sexual
orientation, Judge Walker continued: “Having considered . . . the fact that Proposition 8
eliminates a right only a gay man or a lesbian would exercise, the court determines that
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Following Windsor’s invalidation of DOMA, the sex-discrimination
argument again met with judicial approval. In holding Utah’s marriage
ban unconstitutional, a federal district court there found that the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage constituted sex discrimi-
nation. Addressing a counterargument advanced by the state, the court
wrote: “[T]he fact of equal application to both men and women does not
immunize [the state’s law] from the heightened burden” that equal-
protection jurisprudence imposes on sex-based classifications.66 Years
earlier, New York’s then-chief judge, Judith Kaye, made the same point in
response to the argument that sex discrimination was not present
because the eligibility requirement applied to both men and women. She
wrote: “That the statutory scheme applies equally to both sexes does not
alter the conclusion that the classification here is based on sex.”67 In
Vermont, Justice Johnson also pointedly rejected the equal-application
theory embraced by the majority as a reason to reject the sex-
discrimination argument: “Under the State’s analysis, a statute that
required courts to give custody of male children to fathers and female
children to mothers would not be sex discrimination. Although such a
law would not treat men and women differently, I believe it would dis-
criminate on the basis of sex.”68
In the most extensive development of the sex-discrimination argu-
ment to date, Justice Berzon of the Ninth Circuit elaborated both the
facial-discrimination and stereotyping arguments while concurring in the
plaintiffs’ equal protection claim is based on sexual orientation, but this claim is equivalent to a
claim of discrimination based on sex.” Id. (emphasis added).
66. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1206 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d
1193 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 14-124, 2014 WL 3841263 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014). At the
same time, however, the court did not apply heightened scrutiny to the marriage law
because it found that the measure failed rational-basis review. Id. at 1206–07. On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit addressed the sex-discrimination claim at oral argument but did not
engage with it in its opinion. Oral Argument at 3:55, Kitchen, 755 F.3d 1193 (No. 13-4178),
available at https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/clerk/news/oral-argument-audio-recording-13
-4178-kitchen-v-herbert (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“You have a man who
wants to marry another man. The only thing that bars him from getting married is sex—
gender . . . . Why shouldn’t this be a situation of . . . evaluating the gender for
intermediate scrutiny?”).
67. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 29 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). Here,
Chief Judge Kaye is responding to the position, taken by the majority in Hernandez and by
others elsewhere, that Loving’s rejection of a similar “equal application” argument does
not apply to exclusions of same-sex couples from marriage because antimiscegenation laws
sought to privilege whites whereas the different-sex marriage rule does not similarly
privilege one sex over the other. See id. at 11 (distinguishing Loving, which “was in
substance anti-black legislation,” and stating that “[p]laintiffs do not argue here that the
legislation they challenge is designed to subordinate either men to women or women to
men as a class”); see also supra Part I.B (discussing sex-stereotyping argument).
68. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 906 n.10 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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Ninth Circuit’s invalidation of marriage bans in Idaho and Nevada.69 In
addition to making the basic facial-discrimination argument in ways
already described,70 Judge Berzon offered an extended rejection of the
equal-application theory, observing that, consistent with several decades
of case law, “it is simply irrelevant that the same-sex marriage prohibi-
tions privilege neither gender on the whole or on average” because the
bans “strip individuals of their rights . . . solely on the basis of the
individuals’ gender.”71
B. The Limited Uptake of Sex Stereotyping
Although the stereotype-focused sex-discrimination theory has not
received nearly as much attention (or graphic depiction) from courts as
the formal-equality argument, it has received enough positive mention by
adjudicators to warrant our attention here. Justice Johnson of the
Vermont Supreme Court embraced the argument forthrightly, explain-
ing that the “sex-based classification contained in the marriage laws is
unrelated to any valid purpose, but rather is a vestige of sex-role
stereotyping that applies to both men and women.”72 Elaborating, Justice
Johnson wrote that the state’s asserted purpose of “uniting men and
women to celebrate the ‘complementarity’ . . . of the sexes and providing
male and female role models for children” rested on “broad and vague
generalizations about the roles of men and women that reflect outdated
sex-role stereotyping.”73
Justice John Greaney of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
made the same connection in his Goodridge concurrence, noting the
operation of “ingrained assumptions with respect to historically accepted
roles of men and women within the institution of marriage.”74 And while
the Goodridge majority opinion did not take up the sex-discrimination
argument directly,75 it did recognize the sex stereotypes embedded in
69. Latta v. Otter, Nos. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at *14–*29
(9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring).
70. See, e.g., id. at *14 (“Only women may marry men, and only men may marry
women.”); id. (“A law that facially dictates that a man may do X while a woman may not,
or vice versa, constitutes, without more, a gender classification.”).
71. Id. at *17. Judge Berzon also explained that facial sex discrimination exists
because “the same-sex marriage laws treat the subgroup of men who wish to marry men
less favorably than the otherwise similarly situated subgroup of women who want to marry
men” and vice versa. Id. (“[A] classification that affects only some members of one gender
is still sex discrimination if similarly situated members of the other gender are not treated
the same way.”).
72. Baker, 744 A.2d at 906 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Id. at 909.
74. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 973 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney,
J., concurring).
75. See id. at 961 (majority opinion) (applying rational-basis review rather than
heightened scrutiny required for sex-based classifications). The Ninth Circuit also did not
take up the sex-discrimination argument directly in Latta, but the court signaled possible
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one of the justifications proffered for excluding same-sex couples from
marriage. Rejecting the dissent’s position that mother–father pairs are
optimal for child rearing on the ground that it rested on “stereotypical
premises,” the Court wrote: “That analysis hews perilously close to the
argument, long repudiated by the Legislature and the courts, that men
and women are so innately and fundamentally different that their respec-
tive ‘proper spheres’ can be rigidly and universally delineated.”76
Judge Berzon, concurring in the Idaho and Nevada marriage cases,
elaborated these themes and analyzed the states’ gendered justifications
endorsement with its observation that “the constitutional restraints . . . on sex-role
stereotyping . . . may provide another potentially persuasive answer to defendants’ theory.”
Latta, 2014 WL 4977682, at *9. The court also noted that “defendants have offered no
probative evidence in support of their [gender] ‘complementarity’ argument.” Id.
76. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 965 n.28. Interestingly, in other contexts, courts have
been more open to the argument that this sort of stereotyping falls squarely within sex-
discrimination prohibitions. Especially in employment cases, numerous courts have held
that employers—both public and private—may not require their employees to conform to
sex-role stereotypes. Even in 1989, the Supreme Court expressed no ambivalence on this
point in applying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012), to a
sex-stereotyping claim: “[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group . . . .” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). For further discussion
of the sex-discrimination argument’s success in this arena, see generally Mary Anne Case,
Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title VII’s Prohibition on Sex
Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect of ENDA, 66
Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1338–61 (2014) (discussing the impact of Price Waterhouse and noting in
its wake an “increasing trend of the lower courts to protect sexual minorities under the
text of Title VII”).
Since that time, numerous circuit courts have applied similar reasoning to reject
employer demands for sex-role conformity, including in connection with harassment of
and discrimination against gay and transgender employees. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby,
663 F.3d 1312, 1320–21 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding discrimination based on gender
nonconformity constitutes sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, and
finding employer’s decision to fire plaintiff based on “sheer fact of his transition” from
male to female impermissible); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 571–72 (6th Cir.
2004) (concluding fire department impermissibly suspended transsexual firefighter for
“his failure to conform to sex stereotypes by expressing less masculine, and more feminine
mannerisms and appearance”); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (finding it “clear” that sexualized attacks on gay employee stated sex-
discrimination claim under Title VII); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding harassment of gay waiter because of his effeminate mannerisms
constituted sex discrimination under Title VII).
Likewise, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has rejected
employer demands for sex conformity from lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
employees. See Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (Apr. 20, 2012), available
at http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120120821%20Macy%20v%20DOJ%20ATF.txt (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (holding discrimination based on gender identity
constitutes discrimination because of sex under Title VII); Veretto v. Donahoe, EEOC
Appeal No. 0120110873, 2011 WL 2663401, at *3 (July 1, 2011) (stating that
discrimination against individual based on marriage to a same-sex spouse can give rise to
sex-stereotyping claim under Title VII).
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amid several decades of sex-stereotyping case law.77 She also highlighted
chronological changes in civil marriage from enforced inequality
between male and female spouses to today, when “a combination of
constitutional sex-discrimination adjudication, legislative changes, and
social and cultural transformation has, in a sense, already rendered
contemporary marriage ‘“genderless,”’ to use the phrase favored by the
defendants.”78 Against that backdrop, Judge Berzon concluded that
“[t]he same sex marriage prohibitions seek to preserve an outmoded,
sex-role-based vision of the marriage institution.”79
Although my primary interest here concerns judicial receptivity to
the sex-discrimination argument, it bears noting that both versions of the
argument have academic support as well.80 Relatively few legal scholars
spend time elaborating the facial-discrimination argument because it is
so straightforward,81 but many have focused on showing how govern-
77. Latta, 2014 WL 4977682, at *18–*29 (Berzon, J., concurring). Judge Berzon
described the states’ claims:
The defendants, for example, assert that “gender diversity or complementarity
among parents . . . provides important benefits” to children, because “mothers
and fathers tend on average to parent differently and thus make unique
contributions to the child’s overall development.” The defendants similarly
assert that “[t]he man–woman meaning at the core of the marriage institution,
reinforced by the law, has always recognized, valorized, and made normative the
roles of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ and their uniting, complementary roles in raising
their offspring.”
Id. at *19 (alterations in original). She then wrote:
Viewed through the prism of the Supreme Court’s contemporary anti-
stereotyping sex discrimination doctrine, these proffered justifications simply
underscore that the same-sex marriage prohibitions discriminate on the basis of
sex, not only in their form—which, as I have said, is sufficient in itself—but also
in reviving the very infirmities that led the Supreme Court to adopt an
intermediate scrutiny standard for sex classifications in the first place.
Id.
78. Id. at *23.
79. Id. at *20; see also id. at *23 (describing “‘the sex-based classification contained
in the[se] marriage laws’” as, “at best, ‘a vestige of sex-role stereotyping’ that long plagued
marital regimes before the modern era . . . and, at worst, an attempt to reintroduce
gender roles” (alteration in original) (quoting Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 906 (Vt. 1999)
(Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
80. See, e.g., Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 32, at 1213–27
(discussing formal-equality and sex-stereotyping theories). See generally supra notes 32–33
(discussing additional scholarship related to both sex-discrimination theories).
81. But see, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sexual and Gender Variation in American
Public Law: From Malignant to Benign to Productive, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1333, 1352 (2010)
(describing exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage as “last major state sexual
orientation discrimination—and one of the last sex discriminations—to be revoked”);
Andrew Koppelman, Response: Sexual Disorientation, 100 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1087 (2012)
(“[California’s registrars] are not instructed to ask . . . whom you have had sex with in the
past[] or how you self-identify because the discriminatory law . . . does not classify on any
of those bases . . . . [They ask] whether the couple includes one male and one female.”);
see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case for Same-Sex Marriage 152–82 (1996)
(contending that the facial-discrimination argument can be applied to “require the state
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mental maintenance of the sex-based eligibility rule depends on and
perpetuates sex stereotypes.82 As Sylvia Law explained in a landmark 1988
article, “[C]ontemporary legal and cultural contempt for lesbian women
and gay men serves primarily to preserve and reinforce the social
meaning attached to gender.”83 Andrew Koppelman has likewise written
extensively on the point that “discrimination against gays is a kind of sex
discrimination,” explaining that “sexism is an important wellspring of
antigay animus and the homosexuality taboo functions to strengthen
gender hierarchy.”84
III. WHY SO LITTLE TRACTION FOR THE SEX-DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT IN
MARRIAGE CASES?
Although the opinions just discussed were unequivocal that male–
female marriage eligibility and recognition requirements discriminate
based on sex, these are but a handful of opinions in a much larger
universe.85
The argument that is so clearly right to its proponents86 turns out to
be either wrong or unworthy of engagement in the view of nearly every
to justify its discriminatory sex-based classification statutes prohibiting same-sex
marriage”); Koppelman, Sex Discrimination, supra note 54, at 201–14 (describing and
defending the facial-discrimination argument).
82. See, e.g., Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 32, at 1216–27
(discussing development of sex-stereotyping jurisprudence); Widiss et al., supra note 32, at
479–87 (discussing sex stereotyping within government rationales for marriage bans).
83. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L.
Rev. 187, 187. That year, Suzanne Pharr published her pathbreaking book-length
treatment of the ways in which hostility toward lesbians and gay men is used to maintain
sex roles. See Suzanne Pharr, Homophobia: A Weapon of Sexism (1988) (developing links
between sexism and hostility toward lesbians and gay men).
84. Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 Drake L. Rev. 923, 946–
48 (2010) [hereinafter Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality]; see also Koppelman,
Sex Discrimination, supra note 54, at 234–57 (“Laws that discriminate against gays are the
product of a political decisionmaking process that is biased by sexism. They implicitly
stigmatize women, and they reinforce the hierarchy of men over women.”).
85. Indeed, not one is a controlling appellate opinion. As a federal district court in
Wisconsin recently wrote, after describing the Hawaii Supreme Court’s sex-discrimination
analysis, “Since then, however, the sex discrimination theory has been rejected by most
courts to consider it, even those ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on other grounds.” Wolf v.
Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1008 (W.D. Wis.), aff’d sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d
648 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 14-278, 2014 WL 4425163 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014). A federal
district court in Hawaii observed similarly that “[t]he vast majority of courts considering
the issue [have concluded] that an opposite-sex definition of marriage does not constitute
gender discrimination.” Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1098 (D. Haw.
2012), vacated as moot, No. 12-16995, 2014 WL 5088199 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2014).
86. In her concurring opinion in the Idaho and Nevada marriage cases, Judge
Berzon repeatedly characterized the sex-discrimination argument as “obvious.” See, e.g.,
Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420, 2014 WL 4977682, at *15 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (Berzon, J.,
concurring) (stating that “same-sex marriage prohibitions today [are] quite obviously
about gender”); id. at *19 (observing that “obviously, the gender stereotyping at the core
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other judge to whom it has been presented. While this is not surprising
among judges who reject same-sex couples’ claims, the same is true for
most of the judges who find in favor of marriage equality as well. I focus
on those judges’ analysis here to set the foundation for the “risky argu-
ment” discussion that will follow.
A. The Judicial Perspective
Preliminarily, it bears noting that most courts sidestep the sex-
discrimination argument entirely. Indeed, of the many opinions striking
down marriage discrimination against same-sex couples in the first year
following the Windsor ruling, only six engaged in any analysis of it, and
only two accepted it.87
Courts that favor marriage equality but reject the sex-discrimination
argument tend to follow two basic lines of reasoning. First, many dismiss
the formal-equality argument on the ground that the rule applies equally
to both men and women.88 Second, many reject the stereotyping theory
on the ground that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage was
not intended to perpetuate sex stereotypes or the subordination of
women to men, unlike, for example, the “equal application” antimiscege-
nation law in Loving that the Supreme Court found was “designed to
maintain White Supremacy.”89
On the first, the Vermont Supreme Court, for example, flatly
rejected the sex-discrimination argument even while finding that
Vermont’s refusal to recognize same-sex couples’ relationships violated
of the same-sex marriage prohibitions clarifies that those laws affect men and women in
basically the same way as . . . a wide range of laws and policies that have been viewed
consistently as discrimination based on sex”).
87. For discussion of decisions rejecting the sex-discrimination argument, see infra
notes 103–108 and accompanying text (discussing Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Oregon, and Wisconsin opinions). For opinions accepting the argument, see supra notes
66, 69–71 and accompanying text (discussing Kitchen v. Herbert and Latta v. Otter,
respectively). Other courts during the first year following Windsor invalidated or
preliminarily enjoined laws restricting same-sex couples’ marriage rights only on the
sexual-orientation-discrimination and/or fundamental-rights claims. See, e.g., Whitewood
v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 423–24, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp.
2d 1021, 1026–27, 1029 (S.D. Ind. 2014), aff’d, 766 F.3d 648 , cert. denied, 2014 WL
4425162; Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL 1418395, at *18 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14,
2014); Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759, 769, 771–72 (M.D. Tenn.), rev’d sub nom.
DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341, 2014 WL 5748990 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014), available at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/6th-CA-marriage-ruling-
11-6-14.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632,
639 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Lee v. Orr, No. 13-CV-8719, 2014 WL 683680, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
21, 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 547, 556–57 (W.D. Ky.), rev’d sub nom.
DeBoer, 2014 WL 5748990; Wright v. Arkansas, No. 60CV-13-2662, 2014 WL 1908815, at *6,
*8 (Cir. Ct. Ark. May 9, 2014); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 871, 889 (N.M. 2013).
88. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 991–92 (Mass.
2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999).
89. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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the state constitution.90 “Here, there is no discrete class subject to differ-
ential treatment solely on the basis of sex; each sex is equally prohibited
from precisely the same conduct,” the court wrote.91 The Massachusetts
high court in Goodridge reached the same conclusion: “The
Massachusetts marriage statute does not subject men to different treat-
ment from women; each is equally prohibited from precisely the same
conduct.”92
Defenders of the formal-equality argument typically respond by
invoking Loving’s point that “[t]he mere fact of equal application” does
not render a classifying law constitutional.93 In Baehr v. Lewin, for exam-
ple, the Hawaii Supreme Court plurality relied on Loving’s “reject[ion
of] the notion that the mere ‘equal application’ of a statute containing
racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the
Fourteenth Amendment’s proscriptions of all invidious discrimina-
tions.”94 The Hawaii court added: “Substitution of ‘sex’ for ‘race’ and
[the Hawaii Constitution’s Equal Rights Amendment] for the fourteenth
amendment yields the precise case before us together with the con-
clusion that we have reached.”95 Likewise, as Chief Judge Kaye wrote in
New York, “The ‘equal application’ approach to equal protection analysis
was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Loving . . . .”96
But, for many, this observation is inapplicable because, in their view,
the different-sex eligibility rule does not rest on sex stereotypes in the
way that Virginia’s law rested on racial hostility. As the New York Court of
Appeals majority wrote, over Chief Judge Kaye’s dissent:
90. Baker, 744 A.2d at 886 (holding exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage
violated state constitution’s Common Benefits Clause).
91. Id. at 880 n.13. The court also found that “most appellate courts that have
addressed the issue have rejected the claim that defining marriage as the union of one
man and one woman discriminates on the basis of sex.” Id.
92. 798 N.E.2d at 991. Numerous courts that rejected marriage-equality claims also
took this position. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 598 (Md. 2007) (stating that
“it stretch[es] the concept of gender discrimination to assert that [the marriage statute]
applies to treatment of same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples”
(alterations in original) (quoting Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 363 n.2
(D.C. 1995) (Steadman, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hernandez
v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10–11 (N.Y. 2006) (“By limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples,
New York is not engaging in sex discrimination . . . . Women and men are treated alike—
they are permitted to marry people of the opposite sex, but not people of their own sex.”);
Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 989 (Wash. 2006) (holding state marriage
restriction “does not draw any classifications based on sex” because “[i]t does not render
benefits to just one sex, nor does it restrict or deny rights of one sex”).
93. 388 U.S. at 8.
94. 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 8) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
95. Id.
96. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 29 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting); see also supra notes 69–71
and accompanying text (discussing Judge Berzon’s rejection of the equal-application
argument).
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This is not the kind of sham equality that the Supreme Court
confronted in Loving ; the statute there, prohibiting black and
white people from marrying each other, was in substance anti-
black legislation. Plaintiffs do not argue here that the legislation
they challenge is designed to subordinate either men to women
or women to men as a class.97
Similarly, as the Vermont Supreme Court majority stated:
It is one thing to show that long-repealed marriage statutes
subordinated women to men within the marital relation. It is
quite another to demonstrate that the authors of the marriage
laws excluded same-sex couples because of incorrect and
discriminatory assumptions about gender roles or anxiety about
gender-role confusion. That evidence is not before us.98
Against that backdrop, the Vermont court indicated that it was “not
persuaded that sex discrimination offers a useful analytic framework for
determining” the plaintiff couples’ rights.99 By implication, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court can be seen to have adopted the
same reasoning, finding that the state equal-rights amendment was
inapplicable to the different-sex marriage rule because the amendment
was intended to “prohibit laws that advantage one sex at the expense of
the other.”100
In the California Supreme Court’s 2008 ruling granting marriage
rights, which was functionally overturned by Proposition 8’s restriction
on marriage for same-sex couples, Chief Justice George went on at length
to reject the sex-discrimination argument on all of these grounds. Rely-
ing on numerous earlier cases, he wrote that, “in realistic terms, a statute
97. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11.
98. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999).
99. Id. at 880 n.13. But Justice Johnson, in her concurrence, suggested that the
majority had missed her point:
I do not contend, as the majority suggests, that the real purpose of the
exclusion of same-sex partners from the marriage laws was to maintain
certain male and female stereotypes . . . . I agree that the original purpose
was very likely not intentionally discriminatory toward same-sex couples.
The question is whether the State may maintain a classification today only
by giving credence to generally discredited sex-role stereotyping.
Id. at 906 n.11 (Johnson, J., concurring).
100. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 991 (Mass. 2003).
Alternately, this part of the Goodridge opinion can be read as rejecting the formal-equality
argument, which would mean that the Goodridge majority opted not to engage with the
substantive-equality argument at all, even though that argument was proffered by the
concurrence.
Judges who oppose marriage equality tend to maintain Loving’s inapplicability even
more vigorously. As a Connecticut Supreme Court justice who dissented from the
majority’s decision to recognize marriage rights wrote, “The two cases are in no way
similar.” Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 503 n.26 (Conn. 2009)
(Borden, J., dissenting). Allowing same-sex couples to marry, he wrote, would alter the
nature of marriage by threatening the “survival of the human race” in a way that allowing
interracial couples to marry would not. Id.
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or policy that treats same-sex couples differently from opposite sex
couples . . . does not treat an individual man or an individual woman
differently because of his or her gender but rather accords differential
treatment because of the individual’s sexual orientation.”101 If courts were to
find “illegitimate gender-related stereotyping based on the view that men
are attracted to women and women are attracted to men,” then sexual-
orientation discrimination “always would constitute a subset of discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex,” he added.102
Following Windsor, a couple of other courts also went out of their
way to reject the sex-discrimination argument while still striking down
the challenged marriage bans. In Oklahoma, for example, a federal
district court echoed the observation of some others just mentioned that
the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage “does not place any
disproportionate burdens on men and women, and does not draw upon
stereotypes applicable only to male or female couples.”103 Most signifi-
cantly, though, the court doubted that sex discrimination (or at least its
view of sex discrimination) had motivated the law’s enactment:
“Common sense dictates that the intentional discrimination occurring in
this case has nothing to do with gender-based prejudice or stereo-
types . . . .”104 Similarly, a federal district court in Oregon concluded that
“[t]he targeted group here is neither males nor females, but homosexual
males and homosexual females. Therefore, I conclude the state’s mar-
riage laws discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, not gender.”105
The New Mexico Supreme Court, which found the equal-application
point persuasive in its rejection of the sex-discrimination argument, also
stressed that its own sex-discrimination case law “has been gender-based,
scrutinizing the historical discrimination against women.”106 Interest-
ingly, a district court in Idaho, while also rejecting the sex-discrimination
argument on similar grounds, recognized nonetheless that “[a] person’s
gender and sexual orientation are two sides of the same coin,”107 and
invoked the district court’s observation in Perry v. Schwarzenegger that “sex
and sexual orientation are necessarily interrelated, as an individual’s
101. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 437 (Cal. 2008).
102. Id. at 439.
103. Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1286 (N.D. Okla.
2014).
104. Id.
105. Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1140 (D. Or. 2014).
106. Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 880 (N.M. 2013).
107. Latta v. Otter, No. 1:13-cv-00482-CWD, 2014 WL 1909999, at *15 (D. Idaho May
13) (“[T]wo men have no more right to marry under Idaho law than two women. In other
words, Idaho’s Marriage Laws are facially gender neutral and there is no evidence that
they were motivated by a gender discriminatory purpose.”), aff’d, No. 14-35420, 2014 WL
4977682 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014).
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choice of romantic or intimate partner based on sex is a large part of
what defines an individual’s sexual orientation.”108
B. Theoretical Concerns
Scholarly skepticism toward the sex-discrimination argument as a
means for challenging antigay discrimination overlaps somewhat with the
case law that rejects the argument in the marriage context. Both reject
the formal-equality analysis as inadequate and superficial; both maintain,
too, that a state interest in sex stereotyping does not persuasively explain
why governments maintain laws and policies that have the primary
purpose and effect of burdening gay people.109 Still, to round out consid-
eration of the possible reasons for the sex-discrimination argument’s
minimal traction, I consider several of the leading theoretical objections
to the argument.
Among the argument’s most prominent critics is Edward Stein,
whose position is that the argument is “sociologically, theoretically, and
morally flawed.”110 In particular, Stein has contended that, “[w]hile many
laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation have their
origins in sexism, these laws are maintained because of homophobia and
108. Id. (quoting Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal.
2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A district court in Wisconsin summarized the landscape in this way:
Although the reasoning of the courts rejecting the theory has varied,
the general view seems to be that a sex discrimination theory is not viable,
even if the government is making a sex-based classification with respect to
an individual, because the intent of the laws banning same-sex marriage is
not to suppress females or males as a class . . . . In other words, courts view
this theory as counterintuitive and legalistic, an attempt to “bootstrap”
sexual-orientation discrimination into a claim for sex discrimination.
Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1008 (W.D. Wis.), aff’d sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 766
F.3d 648 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 14-278, 2014 WL 4425163 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014). The
court then invoked two Seventh Circuit opinions—one in the grooming-code context,
which suggested that a rule imposing “comparable burdens on both sexes” might be
permissible, id. at 1009 (citing Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743
F.3d 569, 581 (7th Cir. 2014)), and the other in a workplace-harassment case, which
recognized “a considerable overlap in the origins of sex discrimination and homophobia,”
but declined to “go so far” as “to conclude that anti-gay bias should, in fact, be understood
as a form of sex discrimination,” id. (quoting Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d
563, 593 n.27 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
109. There is substantial theoretical literature that supports and defends the sex-
discrimination argument’s applicability to these laws and policies as well. See supra notes
80–84 and accompanying text (presenting literature on the sex-discrimination argument).
110. Stein, supra note 38, at 474. Notably, Stein does not object categorically to the
use of the argument but maintains instead that “the sex discrimination argument, given its
practical and theoretical pitfalls, if presented at all, should be used with caution.” Id. at
515.
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despite the repeal of many sexist laws.”111 Consequently, he maintains
that “to simply deploy the sex discrimination argument against sodomy
laws would . . . ignore the central role that conceptions of sexual desire
play in such laws” and would “overlook[] the distinctive role that ‘the
closet,’ and the associated invisibility of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals,
play in the justification and maintenance of sodomy laws and of sexual
orientation discrimination generally.”112
In short, Stein argues, “[t]he sociological objection is that, as a
cultural fact, lesbians and gay men, not women, suffer the greatest harm
from laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.”113 He
adds: “The theoretical objection is that laws that discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation are primarily maintained by homophobia, not
by sexism.”114 From a moral standpoint, Stein asserts: “By failing to
111. Id. at 499–500. Of course, many sexist laws have been invalidated by courts
rather than repealed by legislatures. See Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some
Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 14 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 151, 154–56
(1992) (discussing numerous Supreme Court decisions striking down sex-based
classifications).
Applying his point to sodomy laws, Stein argues that “[d]espite the fact that sexism
played a role in their development, such laws are now maintained primarily by animus
towards lesbians and gay men, and by repulsion towards them and the sexual activities they
engage in (as well as by repulsion towards sexual activities generally).” Stein, supra note
38, at 500. Although William Eskridge has since shifted to support use of the sex-
discrimination argument, he earlier observed, consistent with Stein’s argument, that
“[j]udges may find it difficult to understand how denying two gay men the right to marry
is driven by an ideology that oppresses straight women.” Eskridge, A History, supra note
63, at 1510.
112. Stein, supra note 38, at 500–01.
113. Id. at 502. It bears noting that a number of laws restricting same-sex couples’
marriage rights also implicate the rights of different-sex couples who would want some
form of nonmarital recognition for their union. See, e.g., Ky. Const. § 233A (“A legal
status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall
not be valid or recognized.”); N.D. Const. art. XI, § 28 (“Marriage consists only of the
legal union between a man and a woman. No other domestic union, however
denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially
equivalent legal effect.”); Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11 (“This state and its political
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of
marriage.”).
114. Stein, supra note 38, at 502; see also Nan D. Hunter, The Sex Discrimination
Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & Pol’y 397, 409 (2001) (“To many people, including
many feminists, the sex discrimination argument in gay rights cases seems too clever by
half. For some, that is because it seems to be a dodge around what they sense is really
going on, which is the subordination of homosexuality.”).
Holning Lau has also advanced a theory of aggregate rights of couples not to be
discriminated against, including based on sexual orientation, on the ground that “an
individual’s identity is inextricably linked to her memberships in certain social collectives”
and that protecting an “individual requires not only protecting her individual right to
associate with those collective entities, but also protecting those entities’ aggregate rights
to develop.” Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1271, 1273 (2006). On this couples’-rights theory,
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address arguments about the morality of same-sex sexual acts and the
moral character of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals, the sex discrimi-
nation argument ‘closets,’ rather than confronts, homophobia.”115
The wave of “defense of marriage” laws enacted at both the federal
and state levels after the Hawaii Supreme Court’s 1993 Baehr ruling
arguably reinforces Stein’s point that gay people, not sex roles, were the
real target of these laws.116 As the Supreme Court pointed out in Windsor,
Congress’s aim in enacting DOMA was to express “both moral disap-
proval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality
better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.”117
Further, “[t]he stated purpose of the law was to promote an ‘interest in
protecting the traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only
marriage laws.’”118 In other words, if an interest in instantiating sex roles
underlies the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, it is not
nearly as overt as the interest in privileging heterosexuals over gay
people. In this sense, sex-stereotyping arguments would obscure or miss
the reason why laws exclude same-sex couples from marriage.
In a related vein, Martha Nussbaum argues that disgust—in parti-
cular, disgust at sexual intimacy between men—is at the heart of laws that
discriminate against lesbians and gay men.119 Consistent with this pre-
mise, she asserts that opposition to marriage equality is “really not about
whether same-sex relationships can involve the content of marriage” but
instead is prompted by disgust reactions to the sex acts that might take
place between men in those relationships.120 For this reason, she charac-
terizes the formal sex-discrimination argument as “legalistic in the
he argues that the sex-discrimination argument is normatively unsatisfactory because it
“does not shine due recognition on the couple qua couple.” Id. at 1296. He adds:
“Although the legal outcome may be functionally equivalent, by not recognizing sexual
orientation discrimination as such, the moral recognition of sexual minorities becomes
the marginalized stepchild of sex discrimination principles.” Id. at 1296–97.
115. Stein, supra note 38, at 503–04. Stein also advances several practical concerns
associated with the use of sex-discrimination arguments to confront sexual-orientation
discrimination that are less directly relevant here. See id. at 509–10 (discussing, inter alia,
the limited effectiveness of sex-discrimination theory against laws that do not make sex-
based classifications).
116. See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Sylvia A. Law, Baehr v. Lewin and the Long
Road to Marriage Equality, 33 U. Haw. L. Rev. 705, 725–26 (2011) (“By the time the Baehr
v. Lewin litigation came to an end in 1998, thirty-one states had enacted laws to prevent
the recognition of same-sex marriages.”). This is somewhat ironic given the sex-
discrimination focus of the Hawaii ruling. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text
(discussing plurality opinion in Baehr v. Lewin).
117. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
104-664, at 12–13 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id.
119. See Martha C. Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation &
Constitutional Law 116 (2010) (arguing prejudice against gay men “drives antigay efforts
in America” in part because of “profound anxieties about bodily penetrability and
vulnerability”).
120. Id. at 130.
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pejorative sense” because “it doesn’t quite get at what is really going
on,”121 which is an intent to “penalize[]” homosexuality.122
While these objections to the sex-discrimination argument may be
persuasive to some readers, none comes close to rendering the sex-
discrimination argument so wrong or implausible as to not be worth
making.123 Indeed, as noted earlier, even Stein does not take that
position.124 One need only return to the comments of judges who favor
the sex-discrimination argument to see that the theoretical critiques,
however interesting and potentially valid, are hardly devastating.
IV. OTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SEX-DISCRIMINATION
ARGUMENT’S LIMITED TRACTION
So, if the sex-discrimination argument, either in its formal- or
substantive-equality iteration, is at least plausible to some and quite
persuasive to others, we must search elsewhere to understand why it has
gotten so little traction in court. Here, the discussion turns to several
types of considerations that might shed light, including litigation
logistics, doctrine, social-movement goals, and the mindset of the lawyers
and judges who frame these cases. Ultimately, I argue that while these
categories of reasons might explain why advocates do not lead with the
sex-discrimination argument and why some courts avoid it, they do not,
either individually or together, fully explain the sex-discrimination argu-
ment’s mixed reception of fervent embrace alongside disregard and
hostile rejection.
121. Id. at xii–xxiv, 115. For this reason, Carlos Ball characterized the sex-
discrimination argument as having “little rhetorical weight.” Carlos A. Ball, Moral
Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism,
85 Geo. L.J. 1871, 1880 (1997).
122. Nussbaum, supra note 119, at 115. For extended commentary on Nussbaum’s
argument from a scholar who embraces the sex-discrimination theory, see generally Mary
Anne Case, A Lot to Ask: Review Essay of Martha Nussbaum’s From Disgust to Humanity:
Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law, 19 Colum. J. Gender & L. 89 (2010) (book
review) (critiquing Nussbaum’s theory that disgust underlies opposition to legal rights for
gay people).
123. Koppelman has responded to Nussbaum by explaining that his argument “does
not . . . purport to be a complete explanation of where the discrimination is coming from”
but rather a claim that “sex discrimination is one of the many wrongs present in antigay
discrimination.” Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, supra note 84, at 947. Along
these lines, Judge Berzon observed in her Latta concurrence that “the gender classifica-
tion rubric does not adequately capture the essence of many of the restrictions targeted at
lesbian, gay, and bisexual people” and acknowledged some exclusions “are primarily
motivated by stereotypes about sexual orientation; by animus against people based on
their nonconforming sexual orientation; and by distaste.” Latta v. Otter, Nos. 14-35420, 14-
35421, 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at *28 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring).
124. See Stein, supra note 38, at 514–15 (“I have not, however, argued that the sex
discrimination argument for lesbian and gay rights should never be made.”).
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A. Litigation Logistics
The logistics of briefwriting and oral argument might partially
explain why litigators do not prioritize the sex-discrimination argument,
which in turn might help explain why many judges disregard it.125 Most
basically, the argument’s limited success in court minimizes the incentive
for the rational, time- and space-limited lawyer to do more than give the
argument a mere mention.126 Put another way, why should advocates
stress an argument that has such a mixed record? There are reasons for
doing so, actually, including that the stereotyping argument helps illumi-
nate the gendered nature of a government’s justifications restricting
marriage to different-sex couples127 and that, for some judges, the sex-
discrimination argument, with its accompanying heightened scrutiny,
might be a more appealing analytic frame.128
But the stereotyping version of the argument, in particular, is
relatively complicated to make as compared to demonstrating facial
discrimination or setting out either the sexual-orientation or antitarget-
ing argument.129 Because it is not self-evident to most people that a male–
female marriage rule rests on impermissible sex stereotypes,130 develop-
ing the theory takes time, and the relative value of that discussion must
be weighed against the realities of word limits for briefs and judicial
attention spans.131
125. Similar strategic concerns may also lead a judge who finds the argument
persuasive not to mention it in the interest of achieving unanimity with colleagues who
support a marriage-equality outcome for different reasons.
126. Of course, some lawyers may leave the argument out because they do not find it
persuasive, perhaps for the reasons discussed above. See supra Part I.A–C.
127. See Latta, 2014 WL 4977682, at *24 (Berzon, J., concurring) (describing the
rationales for excluding same-sex couples from marriage, including gender complemen-
tarity of parents, as “laden with the very ‘“baggage of sexual stereotypes”’ the Supreme
Court has repeatedly disavowed” (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979))).
128. This was likely true for the Texas appellate judge who voted to strike down
Texas’s “homosexual conduct” law at a time when a ruling on sexual-orientation-
discrimination grounds might have seemed politically or doctrinally infeasible. See supra
note 56 (discussing the sex-discrimination reasoning in this dissent). Likewise, particularly
prior to Windsor, for many judges who were inclined to evaluate sexual-orientation
classifications under rational-basis review, the heightened scrutiny required for sex
discrimination could have provided an easier path to reject the government’s
justifications.
129. See supra Part I.A–B (explaining sex-discrimination and other legal theories in
marriage cases).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 97–108 (discussing judicial rejection of
theory that restrictions on same-sex couples’ marriages constitute sex discrimination).
131. Indeed, even at the district-court level where word limits are less typical or rigid,
litigators must still decide whether the gains from developing the argument outweigh the
costs of filing a long brief. As a point of reference, one recent brief that developed the
argument at length devoted roughly four pages of a sixty-page brief to the point. See
Harris Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Brief, supra note 42, at 23–27 (arguing
that Virginia’s marriage bans are subject to heightened scrutiny because they contain
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Related to these considerations are concerns about dilution. If an
advocate or a judge believes that either the sexual-orientation or the
antitargeting argument is particularly strong, there may be reluctance to
“pile on” an additional argument that, even if worthy, might divert
attention from stronger or otherwise more effective theories.132 So, for
example, if all judges who are prepared to strike down a marriage exclu-
sion are willing to accept a sexual-orientation-focused theory and only
some of those judges will accept a sex-based theory, the sex-based
argument may be superfluous and, potentially, costly.
Again, however, given the argument’s persistent, albeit occasional,
successes and the ways in which it supports the sexual-orientation-
discrimination argument, it is not an obvious candidate for dilution-
related critiques. Indeed, if dilution—or, further, hostility toward the
explicit sex-based classifications and perpetuate stereotyped notions of familial roles of
men and women).
132. This may help explain a particular reluctance to press the argument at the
Supreme Court level, where Justice Kennedy had earlier rejected antigay discrimination
on other grounds. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 578–79 (2003) (“The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives . . . . Their right to liberty under
the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government.”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–36 (1996)
(concluding that Colorado’s amendment banning antidiscrimination protections for gay
people violated the Equal Protection Clause because it singled out a group without a
legitimate purpose).
By contrast, Justice Kennedy was not persuaded by his colleagues’ arguments that sex
stereotyping was enough to justify the Family Medical Leave Act in Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), and described “evidence of gender-based
stereotypes” as “too remote” to justify granting of family leave. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 748
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Nor was he convinced that sex stereotyping was present in ways
that justified invalidating Congress’s different immigration rules for mothers and fathers
in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). Likewise, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in a decision
upholding Congress’s “partial-birth abortion ban” included a much-criticized observation
that one permissible reason for the law derived from congressional concern about women
who “come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”
Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). For commentary on that observation, see,
e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 Duke L.J. 1641, 1648–81 (2008) (discussing
the supplanting of the constitutional argument that “[a]bortion kills a baby” with the rise
of a woman-protective antiabortion argument that “[a]bortion hurts women”).
Notably, however, Justice Kennedy indicated his interest in the sex-discrimination
argument during the Perry oral argument, though neither Perry nor Windsor ultimately
addressed the measures at issue through that lens. He raised the question directly to
Charles Cooper, the lawyer for Proposition 8’s sponsors: “Do you believe this can be
treated as a gender-based classification? . . . It’s a difficult question that I’ve been trying to
wrestle with . . . .” Hollingsworth Transcript, supra note 13, at 13.
Interestingly, too, while Cooper said that his clients “do not think it is properly
viewed as a gender-based classification” and pointed to the argument’s rejection by many
courts, he also conceded the presence of sex—and sex roles—within marriage. Id. He said:
“I guess it is gender-based in the sense that marriage itself is a gendered institution, a
gendered term, and so in the same way that fatherhood is gendered . . . motherhood is
gendered, it’s gendered in that sense.” Id.
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argument133—were a serious concern, advocates would not support or
encourage submission of amicus briefs elaborating the sex-discrimination
theories that have been filed in many marriage cases on appeal.134
B. Doctrinal Challenges
In sync with these concerns are three additional ways that the
doctrine itself might limit receptivity to the argument. First, while case
law rejecting sex stereotyping is now plentiful, it has developed primarily
in the employment context and largely under Title VII, rather than the
Equal Protection Clause.135 Second, historically, a sex-discrimination
ruling would have called into question other laws mandating sexual-
orientation discrimination in ways that likely caused concern for some
judges. At a time when governments criminalized sexual intimacy
between same-sex couples,136 barred openly gay people from military
133. As noted earlier, courts have sometimes made a special point of rejecting the
sex-discrimination argument even while accepting the sexual-orientation-discrimination
argument. See supra notes 97–108 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae National Women’s Law Center et al. in Support
of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor on the Merits at 19–33, United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter NWLC Windsor Brief], 2013 WL 785633,
at *22–*27 (arguing laws that discriminate based on sexual orientation frequently are
based on gender stereotypes); NWLC Baskin Brief, supra note 41, at 14–21 (same); NWLC
Tanco Brief, supra note 41, at 14–21 (same); Amici Curiae Brief of the National Women’s
Law Center et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees & Affirmance at 13–22, DeBoer v.
Snyder, No. 14-1341, 2014 WL 5748990 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014), available at
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Obergefell-Brief-2014-5-1-
FINAL-FINAL.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same).
135. See supra note 76 (discussing Price Waterhouse, which established gender stereo-
typing as a form of sex discrimination, and related cases). For a government-employment
case that validated a sex-stereotyping theory in an equal-protection analysis, see Glenn v.
Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1299 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (“[D]iscrimination against a
transgendered individual because of their failure to conform to gender stereotypes
constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.”).
There is also little doctrine related to the facial-discrimination theory outside the
marriage cases. Cf. Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 441–48 (Or. Ct. App.
1998) (rejecting trial court’s conclusion that Oregon Health Sciences University’s denial
of spousal benefits to employees with same-sex partners was sex discrimination and instead
finding that sexual-orientation discrimination had occurred).
To the extent the stereotyping argument rests on an antisubordination theory of
equality, that theory, too, has been met with relative disinterest by the Supreme Court in
equal-protection analysis. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88
Va. L. Rev. 951, 1009–10 (2002) (“Current Supreme Court doctrine understands equal
protection as an antidiscrimination principle rather than an antisubordination
principle . . . .”); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1537–44 (2004)
[hereinafter Siegel, Equality Talk] (“[T]he Court embraced anticlassification and
repudiated antisubordination when it . . . refused to make equal protection doctrine
responsive to concerns of group disadvantage . . . .”).
136. When Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), invalidated sodomy laws in 2003,
thirteen states criminalized sodomy, of which four punished consensual sexual intimacy
only between same-sex partners. Supreme Court Strikes Down Texas Law Banning
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service,137 and restricted parental and adoption rights of gay people,138 a
sex-discrimination ruling in a gay-rights case would have been difficult to
cabin.139 Perhaps some of today’s reluctance to embrace the argument,
when marriage restrictions are typically the only or most prominent
measures whose burden falls largely on lesbians and gay men,140 may
simply be path dependence.141
A third doctrinal point concerns the sex-discrimination argument’s
impact on enduring sex-based distinctions outside of gay-rights cases,
such as those in dress and grooming codes and others related to
Sodomy, N.Y. Times (June 26, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/26/politics/26
WIRE-SODO.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
137. See “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Act, 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2006) (repealed 2010)
(providing discharge from armed forces if service member “engaged in, attempted to
engage in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act”; “stated that he or she is a
homosexual or bisexual”; or “has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of
the same biological sex”).
138. See, e.g., Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Howard, 238 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ark. 2006)
(striking down regulation forbidding adults from serving as foster parents if “any adult
member of that person’s household is a homosexual”); Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families
v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So.3d 79, 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (invalidating ban on
adoption by gay people). Some states continue to ban adoption by unmarried, cohabiting
couples. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-117(3) (LexisNexis 2012) (“A child may not be
adopted by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and
binding marriage under the laws of this state.”).
139. Indeed, this may explain why the Supreme Court did not even address the
argument in Lawrence notwithstanding the challenged law’s facial classification based on
sex. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. For further discussion of Lawrence’s relatively narrow
rationale, see infra notes 178–180 and accompanying text.
Mary Anne Case contrasted the sex-discrimination argument with the potential reach
of a holding based on the fundamental right to marry:
Not that a sex discrimination holding could not have quite radical
implications, but unisex bathrooms and women on football teams are both less
frightening, and more easily avoided, through distinction and manipulation of
existing doctrine, than are polygamy or adult incest, the proximate entrants in
the parade of horribles posed by a privacy/substantive due process holding. A
ruling that the constitutional basis for same-sex marriages is a prohibition on sex
discrimination gets Hawaii same-sex marriages, but puts very little else at risk.
Case, The Very Stereotype, supra note 32, at 1489.
140. See, e.g., Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2012)
(repealing Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’s restriction on military service by lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (striking down law that criminalized sexual
relations between same-sex partners); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996)
(invalidating a ban on antidiscrimination protection for gay, lesbian, and bisexual people
in Colorado).
141. Cf. Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, supra note 84, at 949 (observing
if sex-discrimination argument “is accepted, the acceptance of same-sex marriage
automatically follows, and courts resisted that conclusion as politically impossible,” and
adding “[n]ow that same-sex marriage is thinkable, it may be possible to address the
argument on its merits”).
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parenting and military service.142 Although these distinctions have often
been sustained against sex-discrimination challenges,143 a finding that
142. Another area of concern, though there has been far less litigation, is single-sex
educational programming at public schools per the No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No.
107-110, § 5131(a)(23), 115 Stat. 1425, 1782 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7215(a)(23)
(2012)). For extended discussion of related regulations, see David S. Cohen & Nancy
Levit, Still Unconstitutional: Our Nation’s Experiment with State-Sponsored Sex
Segregation in Education, 44 Seton Hall L. Rev. 339, 341, 384–92 (2014) (arguing single-
sex education “promotes an essentialized view” of gender and “perpetuates existing sex-
based hierarchies”).
143. For hair-length challenges, see, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139
F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (dismissing challenge to policy prohibiting male but not
female employees from having long hair); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907,
908 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding employer’s policy requiring male but not female employees
to have short hair); cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247–49 (1976) (upholding sex-
based hair-grooming standards for police-force employees against a due-process-based
liberty challenge). For discussion of dress codes, see EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F.
Supp. 599, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding employer could not require female employee to
wear “sexually revealing . . . uniform”); Marentette v. Mich. Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909,
912 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (implying dress code requiring sexually provocative wear would not
be permissible). See generally Jennifer L. Levi, Some Modest Proposals for Challenging
Established Dress Code Jurisprudence, 14 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 243, 243 (2007)
(“[T]he classical gender-based dress code—requiring women to conform to feminine
stereotypes and men to conform to masculine stereotypes—has, up to the present, been
sustained by a majority of the courts time and again.”).
Regarding parenting, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), is a hallmark contemporary
case sustaining a rule that differentiates between mothers and fathers. In her Nguyen
dissent, Justice O’Connor lambasted the majority for its stereotypical treatment of women,
writing that “the idea that a mother’s presence at birth supplies adequate assurance of an
opportunity to develop a relationship while a father’s presence at birth does not would
appear to rest only on an overbroad sex-based generalization.” Id. at 86 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). She added:
The claim that [the statute] substantially relates to the achievement of the goal
of a “real, practical relationship” . . . finds support not in biological differences
but instead in a stereotype—i.e., “the generalization that mothers are signifi-
cantly more likely than fathers . . . to develop caring relationships with their
children.” Such a claim relies on “the very stereotype the law condemns,” “lends
credibility” to the generalization, and helps convert that “assumption” into “a
self-fulfilling prophecy.”
Id. at 88–89 (citations omitted). But see Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979)
(rejecting claim of “universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at every
phase of a child’s development”).
With respect to the military, while the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on a sex-
discrimination challenge to limits on women’s service in combat positions, it has heard
challenges related to those limits. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78 (1981)
(upholding exclusion of women from Selective Service registration requirements and
observing that “[m]en and women, because of the combat restrictions on women, are
simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a draft”);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (upholding Navy’s sex-based discharge
and promotion standards that allowed female line officers more time to qualify for
promotion, because restrictions on women’s service meant these officers otherwise would
“not generally have compiled records of seagoing service comparable to those of male
lieutenants”).
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different-sex marriage rules are plagued by sex stereotyping might be
seen as putting these other sex-differentiated rules at risk.144 Here again,
though, this fear may partially reflect path dependence, as some sex-
based grooming and dress codes, as well as the military’s exclusion of
women from combat, have come under challenge either in courts or in
legislatures and are beginning to give way.145
More recently, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of female servicemembers challenging
their exclusion from combat positions. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory &
Injunctive Relief at 1–4, Hegar v. Hagel, No. C 12-06005 EMC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2013),
available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/2013.10.31_hegar_v_hagel_
fac_as_filed.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
144. In addition to the examples just noted, the Court’s decision sustaining different
statutory rape rules for young men and women remains in force today, though nearly all
such laws are now gender neutral. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476
(1981) (upholding constitutionality of a criminal law that barred men, but not women,
from having sexual intercourse with a minor); Jennifer Ann Drobac & Leslie A.
Hulvershorn, The Neurobiology of Decision Making in High-Risk Youth and the Law of
Consent to Sex, 17 New Crim. L. Rev. 502, 513 & n.31 (2014) (describing states’ transition
from gendered to gender-neutral age-of-consent laws).
145. With respect to dress and grooming codes, for example, while some are still
being upheld, see, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107, 1113
(9th Cir. 2006) (upholding casino’s grooming policy requiring female employees to wear
makeup and lipstick, and have their hair “teased, curled, or styled”), others have been
found impermissible, see, e.g., Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743
F.3d 569, 583 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding hair-length policy applicable only to male
basketball players constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title IX); see also Sturgis v.
Copiah Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 30-CV-455-DBJ-FKB, 2011 WL 4351355, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Sept.
15, 2011) (refusing to dismiss a Title IX challenge to school requirement for yearbook
photo of tuxedo for male students and drape for female students). Interestingly, early
decisions and EEOC policy also suggested that sex-specific grooming rules—particularly
those related to men’s hair length—were impermissible without a justification closely
related to workplace responsibilities, reinforcing that the sex-discrimination argument
might have been less risky than a sexual-orientation discrimination claim at an earlier
time. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 482 F.2d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 1973)
(holding gendered hair-length policy “discriminates on the basis of sex,” though also that
a company “may justify its grooming code as a bona fide occupational qualification”);
EEOC Decision No. 72-1380, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 846, 847 (1972) (holding
gendered hair-length policy “discriminates because of sex” and was not a bona fide
occupational qualification as a matter of law).
The military’s sex-based combat exclusion is also set to come to an end, at least in
significant part, if the Department of Defense carries out its recent commitments. In 2013,
a Department of Defense memorandum mandated that combat positions be opened to
women “as expeditiously as possible” and provided that sex-based exclusions could be
maintained only with the personal, nondelegable approval of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. See Memorandum from Martin E. Dempsey,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff & Leon E. Panetta, Sec’y of Def., to the Secretaries of
the Military Departments Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
and Chiefs of the Military Services 1–2 (Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://www.
defense.gov/news/wisrjointmemo.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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C. Social-Movement Strategy
Social-movement strategy might also explain the advocates’ stress on
sexual-orientation-based arguments. Given the role of marriage-equality
advocacy in the LGBT movement’s effort to end discrimination, there is
surely something validating about courts condemning this particular
form of discrimination. The expressive value of a sexual-orientation-
based decision arguably also would reinforce the fair treatment of gay
people generally, another movement goal.146
Compelling as this observation might be, however, the social-
movement preference for victory based on a particular argument does
not map easily onto most litigation, including marriage-equality cases. A
case’s outcome receives far more public attention than its underlying
legal theory.147 Further, and consistent with zealous advocacy norms, it is
standard in litigation to present multiple theories so long as each theory
might help achieve the desired goal.148 In the marriage cases, in parti-
cular, even advocates who set aside the sex-discrimination argument will
advance antitargeting and fundamental-right-to-marry arguments, which
presumably have even less expressive value than the sex-discrimination
argument.
Likewise, it is no secret that the litigation arms of social movements
often approach their goals incrementally not only by the kinds of cases
they select but also by the arguments they pursue.149 As Michael Klarman
has written, advocates for racial and gender equality were “[e]ach
confronted with hostile precedent” and “pursued similar strategies: First,
try to get one’s foot in the door; then, pry it open.”150 But recognizing
146. As is known from other contexts, including antidiscrimination law, enumeration
often has distinct value for both deterrence of harm and empowerment of the protected
group. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 628 (1996) (“Enumeration is the essential device
used to make the duty not to discriminate concrete and to provide guidance for those who
must comply.”); see also Stephen T. Russell et al., Safe Schools Policy for LGBTQ
Students, 24 Soc. Pol’y Rep., no. 4, 2010, at 1, 9 (“[I]n states with comprehensive and
enumerated laws, students . . . reported a higher frequency of staff intervention in
instances of harassment.”).
147. See infra notes 221–223 (discussing the relationship between judicial opinions
and public discourse).
148. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically allow for lawyers to
present alternate theories of their case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) (“A party may set out
two or more statements of a claim . . . . If a party makes alternative statements, the
pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.”).
149. Cf. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court & Elena Kagan,
Dean, Harvard Law Sch., Remarks Commemorating Celebration 55: The Women’s
Leadership Summit (Sept. 20, 2008), in 32 Harv. J.L. & Gender 233, 243 (2009) (noting,
in a statement by Justice Ginsburg, that courts are “not in the vanguard of movements for
social change”).
150. Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform Litigation and Its Challenges: An Essay in
Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 Harv. J.L. & Gender 251, 277 (2009)
[hereinafter Klarman, Social Reform Litigation]. Stories abound about careful strategizing
both in terms of case selection and theory development. Professor Klarman’s article offers
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the value of strategic incrementalism does not tell us which theories are
more incremental than others.
Indeed, one might think that a sex-discrimination argument was the
most incremental of all in the sense that the jurisprudence condemning
sex-based classifications has been established for decades. Moreover, this
jurisprudence brings with it the benefit of heightened scrutiny. Courts
would not have to conclude that a new classification (sexual orientation)
warrants heightened scrutiny or choose between a weak or strong version
of rational-basis review.151
D. Psychosocial Explanations
Viewing the litigation—and, in particular, the judges and lawyers
involved in marriage cases—through a psychosocial lens offers yet
another possible explanation for why the sex-discrimination argument
has not gotten much positive traction in court. On this view, judges’ own
life experiences may limit their capacity to fully absorb the sex-
discrimination argument. Along these lines, Mary Anne Case has offered
what she characterizes as “armchair psychoanalysis” of Ted Olson and
David Boies, counsel for the plaintiffs in Perry, that might apply equally
well to the judges hearing gay couples’ challenges to their exclusion from
marriage:
Let me speculate that they are strongly invested in believing that
their own marriages do not partake in any respect of the ugly
history of marriage law that subordinated wives to husbands and
locked them into fixed sex roles. As members of two career
couples . . . they may also be invested in seeing themselves as
free from “stereotype-based beliefs about the allocation of fam-
ily duties.” Yet as fathers whose careers led them to concentrate
on breadwinning over caregiving, they have a stake . . . in
affirming the value of their gendered contribution to family
life . . . . [A]cknowledging that there is a residuum of sex-
stereotyping in the law and social norms of marriage may be so
deeply threatening to their own sense of themselves as husbands
that they have subconsciously blocked the possibility from their
minds.152
In short, as discussed earlier, it can be particularly challenging to identify
as discriminatory the patterns and practices that are not only widely
accepted in society but also characteristic of one’s own life. Because most
a thoughtful side-by-side comparison of advocacy strategies pursued by the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund and by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and her colleagues at the ACLU Women’s
Rights Project. See generally id. at 275–301.
151. For discussion of how and when the different tiers of scrutiny came to be
established, the relative advantages of each, and the weak and strong versions of rational-
basis review, see generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev.
481, 494–518 (2004).
152. Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 32, at 1232 (quoting Nev. Dep’t
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003)).
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judges are or have been married to different-sex partners,153 the argu-
ment that the different-sex rule expresses state sanction of sex roles
within marriage may cut too close to home to be legible, let alone
persuasive.
V. THE RISKY-ARGUMENT FRAME AND THE (FEARED) SOCIAL POWER OF
JUDICIALDECISIONS
While the assortment of reasons just discussed goes some way toward
explaining why judges and litigators regularly ignore, marginalize, or
reflexively reject sex discrimination as a framework for analyzing same-
sex couples’ exclusion from marriage, the counterpoints to each, along
with the argument’s continued occasional success, suggest that more is at
work.
Here is where a theory of risky arguments comes in to play. In part,
viewing the sex-discrimination argument through the risky-argument
frame calls attention to the way that the argument challenges decision-
makers’ own naturalized sense of sex and gender, as just discussed. While
courts have sometimes been willing to reject certain deeply naturalized
forms of sex discrimination—including, for example, the view that men
are “more conversant with business affairs”154 and “the domestic
sphere . . . properly belongs to the domain and functions of woman-
hood”155—those changes have come only over time and in a social
context that supported them.156 Others have remained sticky and deeply
entrenched, either in the law or in the surrounding society.157 Just think
of the cottage industry devoted to helping us understand the differences
between men and women158 and the raft of judicial decisions sustaining
153. Even those who have not been married no doubt have close family or friends
who are.
154. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1977) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Brief for Respondent at 12, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4), 1971 WL
133597).
155. Id. at 684 (quoting Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (14 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872)
(Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment)).
156. See Klarman, Social Reform Litigation, supra note 150, at 279 (explaining that
the Supreme Court rejected a preference for husbands over wives as estate administrators
in Reed, 404 U.S. 71, only after the Idaho legislature had already “implicitly acknowledged
that the law embraced an obsolete sex stereotype by prospectively repealing it”).
157. For a discussion of how sticky intuitions related to homosexuality, gender roles,
and sexuality more generally enable distinctions based on sexual orientation to continue,
see generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sticky Intuitions and the Future of Sexual Orientation
Discrimination, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1375 (2010).
158. For elaboration of widespread views about differences between men and
women, see, e.g., John Gray, Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus: The Classic
Guide to Understanding the Opposite Sex 5 (1992) (arguing that “men and women
communicate[,] . . . think, feel, perceive, react, respond, love, need, and appreciate
differently”). Although this type of social assertion alone may not be enough to justify
formal sex discrimination in many instances—see, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 541–46 (1996) (rejecting concern that admitting women “would downgrade [Virginia
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different rules for men and women regarding hairstyle, jewelry, or cloth-
ing.159 More generally, the social and legal costs of transgressing sex and
gender boundaries remain high.160 Similarly, many judges, and others,
continue to defend a legally sanctioned preference for people to be
heterosexual rather than gay or bisexual.161
A. Concerns About the Social Power of Legal Reasoning
It is worth highlighting a second, intertwined dimension of the
frame, which focuses attention on the inchoate concerns judges might
have about the social power of their decisions. That is, perhaps the
perception of risk is related not only to an adjudicator’s own sense of the
natural order but also a sense (inflated, as I will argue in a moment) that
a decision in a case has the power to alter that natural order and not just
the practices associated with it. In the context here, the concern would
be that judicial rejection of sex-based distinctions will unsettle gender-
based differences altogether in addition to any particular effects the
decision would have on marriage.162
Military Institute’s] stature, destroy the adversative system and . . . the school” because
inherent differences between men and women are neither “solidly grounded” nor an
exceedingly persuasive justification)—the pervasive belief in essential differences between
men and women contributes to the difficulty faced by those who seek to challenge
distinctions based on sex that are seen as natural.
159. See supra note 143 (discussing sex-based distinctions outside of gay-rights
cases).
160. For further discussion of the institutional and physical violence against those
who transgress gender-role expectations, see Jaime M. Grant, Lisa A. Mottet & Justin
Tanis, Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender Discrimination
Survey 3 (2011), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/
ntds_full.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding high rates of discrimination
against transgender individuals in education, employment, housing, and other settings);
Nat’l Coal. of Anti-Violence Programs, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer and
HIV-Affected Hate Violence in 2012, at 8–9 (2013), available at http://www.avp.org/
storage/documents/ncavp_2012_hvreport_final.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (finding transgender people, transgender people of color, and transgender
women were two to three times more likely than others to experience both police and
physical violence). See generally Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence,
Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits of the Law (2011).
161. See, e.g., Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1111–19 (D. Haw.
2012) (upholding statute banning marriage for same-sex couples), vacated as moot, No.
12-16995, 2014 WL 5088199 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2014); see also supra notes 117–118 and
accompanying text (describing Congress’s aim in enacting DOMA).
162. See infra note 171 (discussing judicial response to sex-discrimination claims
against grooming codes). Legislators often seem to sense their power similarly, as
illustrated by identity-related laws enacted for the purported purpose of serving the
general welfare, such as those restricting women from becoming bartenders or prohibiting
pregnant women from teaching young children, although a full exploration of this point is
beyond the scope here. Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S 632, 647–48 (1974)
(rejecting restriction on pregnant teachers); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465–66
(1948) (sustaining sex-based bartending restriction). See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 Minn. L.
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To be sure, there is no record of adjudicators openly stating that
their decisions have this power or expressing reluctance about exercising
power in this way. Early cases that rejected sex-discrimination arguments,
however, can be read to reflect a similar anxiety about judicial disruption
of social sex roles.163 Certainly, Justice Bradley’s nineteenth-century de-
fense of Illinois’s exclusion of Myra Bradwell from the state bar suggested
as much when he not only proclaimed “[t]he paramount destiny and
mission of woman . . . to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother” per the “law of the Creator,” but also stressed that “the rules of
civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things.”164
Likewise, nearly a century later, the Court rejected a challenge to
women’s automatic exemption from jury service in Florida on the
ground that, “[d]espite the enlightened emancipation of women from
the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into
many parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved to men,
woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life.”165 And
again, in 2001, a majority of the Court sustained a rule treating foreign-
born children of American mothers differently from children of
American fathers because “[t]he difference between men and women in
relation to the birth process is a real one.”166 The dissent, by contrast,
had argued that the sex-based citizenship rule “finds support not in
biological differences but instead in a stereotype—i.e., ‘the generalization
Rev. 1233 (2004) (exploring difficulties associated with judicial evaluation of moral ration-
ales and concluding morality should not be a permissible justification for lawmaking).
163. Reva Siegel’s observation about the evolution of politics regarding women’s
suffrage resonates with this point:
Before the rise of the suffrage movement no one thought that the principles of
the American Revolution required enfranchising women . . . . The suffragists
sought to change constitutional understandings held by members of their
community . . . . Their argument was, if anything, too powerful. The suffrage
claim challenged customary understandings about the natural domain of
constitutional principles in ways that drew into question fundamental social
arrangements.
Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 11, at 1358.
164. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (14 Wall.) 130, 141–42 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added). Similar reasoning appears in decades of decisions that
sustained antimiscegenation laws on the grounds that racial intermarriage violated the
laws of nature. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869) (upholding state’s
antimiscegenation statute based on “[o]ur daily observation . . . that the offspring of these
unnatural connections are generally sickly and effeminate, and that they are inferior in
physical development and strength, to the full-blood of either race”); W. Chester & Phila.
R.R. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 213–14 (1867) (defending decision as “not prejudice, nor caste,
nor injustice of any kind, but simply to suffer men to follow the law of races . . . and not to
compel them to intermix contrary to their instincts”).
165. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1961). It took fourteen years for the Court
to reverse course on this issue. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975) (striking
down rule excluding women from jury pools).
166. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
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that mothers are significantly more likely than fathers . . . to develop
caring relationships with their children.’”167
In these and other cases, the judicial fear—albeit unexpressed—
seems to be that a categorical legal rejection of sex-based rules would also
erase social distinctions between men and women.168 If this fear was not
operative, we would likely see a more consistent set of decisions holding
that jurisprudential and statutory prohibitions of sex discrimination
really mean that sex-based lines cannot stand.169
More graphically, it is almost as though there is an internalized
sense, on the part of at least some judges, that if sex-based rules were not
tolerated on occasion, we would all wind up in unisex tunics, having lost
our sexed and gendered bearings.170 Indeed, this fetishization of the
law’s power over identity may be why sex-discrimination law in the Title
VII context has often stopped so sharply at dress and grooming codes.171
167. Id. at 89 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 482–
83 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
168. Cf. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 11, at 1413 (“Not only the
definition of sex classification but also judgments about what counts as a sex stereotype
continue to evolve as they are socially contested.”).
169. To be sure, the Court has explained its decisions to sustain sex-based rules on
the grounds that legislators had adequate justifications in those instances. See, e.g.,
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62–63 (justifying decision to sustain sex-based rule related to parents of
foreign-born children on grounds of women’s and men’s different roles in childbirth). To
the extent one is dubious of these justifications, as was the dissent in Nguyen, judicial
discomfort with upsetting rules reflecting “natural” sex differences might explain why
some distinctions have remained while most others have been invalidated. See also
Williams, supra note 111, at 152–55 (addressing ways in which the Supreme Court’s sex-
discrimination jurisprudence varies by context).
170. Concerns about gendered bathrooms and disregard of women’s role in giving
birth often arise in casual conversation on this point, though neither seems to be
expressed extensively in judicial opinions, other than Nguyen (discussed supra notes 132,
143, 166–167 and accompanying text, and infra note 194 and accompanying text), or the
law-review literature related to the sex-discrimination argument’s work in these kinds of
cases. Cf. Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional
Vision, 43 New Eng. L. Rev. 799, 837 n.205 (2009) (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Fear
of the Equal Rights Amendment, Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1975, at A21) (discussing Justice
Ginsburg’s view regarding gendered bathrooms in Equal Rights Amendment debates that
“[s]eparate places to disrobe, sleep, perform personal bodily functions are permitted, in
some situations required, by regard for individual privacy”). Reva Siegel has observed that
“the ‘potty issue’ did not die with the ERA. Scholars continued to raise the question of
segregated bathrooms to highlight the difference between race discrimination and sex
discrimination. And constitutional law casebooks continued to discuss the potty issue,
canonizing it as a central question of sex discrimination law.” Reva B. Siegel, She the
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv.
L. Rev. 947, 958 n.26 (2002) (citations omitted).
171. The law’s general reluctance to interfere with employers’ business decisions is
also at play in dress- and grooming-code cases. See D. Wendy Greene, A Multidimensional
Analysis of What Not to Wear in the Workplace: Hijabs and Natural Hair, 8 Fla. Int’l U. L.
Rev. 333, 351 (2013) [hereinafter Greene, What Not to Wear] (discussing “high level of
deference that courts accord to employers in their enactment and enforcement of
grooming codes,” specifically with reference to hairstyle); cf. Elizabeth M. Adamitis,
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As Wendy Williams suggested when reflecting on why other women’s-
rights cases stopped similarly short of rejecting sex-based distinctions,
particularly in the context of military service and parenting, this selective
tolerance of sex discrimination in particular contexts may signal the
“cultural limits of the equality principle.”172
From this vantage point, it is not surprising that most judges decline
to endorse arguments with the potential for such pervasive legal and
social effects. These arguments are, simply put, exactly the sort of risky
arguments most courts would rather avoid. Indeed, the profound
challenge the sex-discrimination argument poses to deeply rooted social
norms may also help explain why some judges, rather than avoid the
argument, go out of their way to reject it even as they rule in favor of
marriage equality.173
B. Avoiding the Risky Argument: A Gay-Rights Case Study
The trajectory of the three major gay-rights cases decided by the
Supreme Court since 1996—Romer v. Evans, Lawrence v. Texas, and United
States v. Windsor—reinforces the risky-arguments account offered here.174
In none of these cases did the Court take up the sex-discrimination
question or even, in an explicit way, the constitutional status of sexual-
orientation-based classifications.175
Appearance Matters: A Proposal to Prohibit Appearance Discrimination in Employment,
75 Wash. L. Rev. 195, 199–211 (2000) (reviewing limited federal and state protections for
appearance-based discrimination as form of sex discrimination).
172. Williams, supra note 111, at 156; see also Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and
Rationality, supra note 84, at 949 (observing that the “bounds of legitimate legal argument
are not set by rules, but by custom and usage”).
173. See supra notes 103–108 and accompanying text (citing examples from courts
in Oklahoma, Oregon, New Mexico, and Idaho).
174. In the interest of disclosure, I was co-counsel in Romer and Lawrence (my formal
involvement in Lawrence was in the state courts) and consulted informally with counsel for
Edith Windsor.
175. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–94 (2013) (striking down DOMA
on an antitargeting theory without explicit reliance on constitutional theories of sex or
sexual-orientation discrimination); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (framing
inquiry as implicating a right to liberty, not sex or sexual-orientation discrimination);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996) (relying on antitargeting rationale in striking
down Colorado amendment).
Unlike the laws at issue in Windsor and Lawrence, the Colorado amendment that
banned antidiscrimination protections for gay people at issue in Romer did not contain an
express sex-based classification, so would not have been susceptible to the facial-
discrimination argument that could have been made against the Texas “homosexual
conduct” law and DOMA, both of which drew explicitly sex-based classifications. Compare
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (stating DOMA, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), defines marriage as
between “one man and one woman”), and Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 564 (describing
Texas’s “homosexual conduct” law, which criminalized conduct only when engaged in by
“persons of the same sex”), with Romer, 517 U.S. at 620 (evaluating a state constitutional
amendment that “prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of
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In Romer, for example, the Court did not engage the question
whether Colorado’s ban on antidiscrimination protections for gay people
amounted to impermissible sexual-orientation discrimination,176 much
less the sex stereotyping arguably embedded in the amendment’s
hostility toward gay people. Instead, Colorado’s amendment fell into a
smaller, more discrete category of discrimination of an unusual character
because it “singl[ed] out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal
status or general hardships.”177
In Lawrence, sex discrimination was an even more obvious reason to
reject the Texas law that criminalized specified sexual acts only for same-
sex partners.178 But the Court opted instead to rule, on due-process
grounds, that protections of individual liberty forbid governments from
criminalizing private sexual conduct between consenting adults,179 a
state or local government designed to protect . . . ‘homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships’” (quoting Colo. Const. art. II, § 30b)).
176. The plaintiffs did not pursue the sexual-orientation-based heightened-scrutiny
argument at the Supreme Court, although they had pursued it in the state-court litigation.
See Evans v. Romer, No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *9 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 1993)
(“First [plaintiffs] claim that homosexuals and bisexuals ought to be found to be a suspect
class and entitled to strict scrutiny review for that reason. Second they claim that
homosexuals and bisexuals ought to be found to be a quasi-suspect class and be entitled to
heightened scrutiny review.”), aff’d, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), aff’d, 517 U.S. 620.
Instead, their brief focused heavily on the political-participation theory embraced by the
Colorado Supreme Court, Evans, 882 P.2d at 1343, as well as the animus-focused argument
that the Court ultimately adopted. See Brief for Respondents at 14, Romer, 517 U.S. 620
(No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 417786 (“Amendment 2 . . . insulates against legal control or
review all instances of governmental and private discrimination based on a particular
characteristic, regardless of context or circumstances. Such a blanket foreclosure of
responsiveness to one group’s interests is rationally related to one purpose alone—the
expression of antipathy toward gay people.”).
Still, arguments focused on sexual-orientation discrimination were before the Court
in amicus briefs. See, e.g., Brief of the Human Rights Campaign Fund as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter HRC Romer
Brief], 1995 WL 17008436, at *5–*25 (arguing that governmental classifications based on
sexual orientation require strict scrutiny). For more on the Romer litigation, see generally
Lisa Keen & Suzanne B. Goldberg, Strangers to the Law: Gay People on Trial (1998).
177. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (citation omitted).
178. As noted earlier, a state-court appellate judge fully embraced the theory. See
supra note 56 (discussing dissenting opinion in Lawrence in state court).
179. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Here, unlike in Romer, the parties challenging the
law had asked the Court to rule directly on the sexual-orientation-discrimination question
under equal-protection doctrine. Id. at 574. Amici also advanced the sex-discrimination
argument. See Brief of NOW Legal Defense & Education Fund as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 4–21, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), available at
http://findlawimages.com/efile/supreme/briefs/02-102/02-102.mer.ami.now.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that Texas law requires adherence to sex
stereotypes and discriminates facially based on sex); see also Brief of Petitioners at 32 n.24,
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152352 (“Heightened equal protection
scrutiny is appropriate for laws . . . that use a sexual-orientation-based classification. It is
also appropriate where, as here, the law employs a gender-based classification to
discriminate against gay people.”). As a reason for not addressing the equal-protection
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ruling that would not call into question restrictions in either the military
or marriage that excluded gay people almost categorically.180
Windsor illustrated even more clearly the Court’s preference for the
narrow, cabinable argument over the broader, norm-confronting argu-
ment.181 Rather than take up the parties on their vigorous debate over
whether heightened scrutiny should apply to classifications that burden
gay people,182 or take up amici on the sex-discrimination question,183 the
Court updated and reapplied a Romer-style analysis.184 The constitutional
argument, the majority wrote that “[w]ere we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn
differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex
participants.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
180. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, which advanced the equal-protection
argument, tried to distinguish the military and marriage cases by suggesting that while
“national security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage” might be
acceptable grounds for discrimination against gay people, they were inapplicable to the
Texas law. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Although most efforts to extend Lawrence to protect other forms of private conduct have
failed, some might question whether this turned out to be the lower-impact choice now
that Lawrence has been relied on successfully, at least in a district court, to restrict a state
from criminally punishing those who engage in polygamy. See Brown v. Buhman, 947 F.
Supp. 2d 1170, 1222–25 (D. Utah 2013) (applying Lawrence to strike down the
cohabitation prong of Utah’s statutory ban on polygamy), aff’d sub nom. Brown v.
Herbert, No. 2:11-CV-0652-CW, 2014 WL 4249865 (D. Utah Aug. 27, 2014).
181. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689–96 (2013) (invalidating
DOMA but avoiding broad classification-based analysis).
182. See, e.g., Windsor Respondent’s Merits Brief, supra note 42, at 17–32
(developing the argument for heightened scrutiny of DOMA’s classification based on a
sexual-orientation-discrimination theory); Brief for the United States on the Merits
Question at 18–36, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) [hereinafter U.S. Windsor Merits
Brief], 2013 WL 683048 (arguing section 3 of DOMA created an impermissible
classification based on sexual orientation and that the classification should be subject to
heightened scrutiny); Brief on the Merits for Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
of the U.S. House of Representatives at 49–59, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307), 2013
WL 267026 (arguing that laws creating classifications based on sexual orientation should
not be subject to heightened scrutiny).
183. See NWLC Windsor Brief, supra note 134, at 2 (“Laws that discriminate based on
sexual orientation share with laws that discriminate based on sex a similar basis in
overbroad gender stereotypes about the preferences and capacities of men and women.”).
184. The federal district court that struck down Utah’s exclusion of same-sex couples
from marriage made this observation directly:
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Windsor is similar [to that in Romer]. The Court
did not analyze the legitimate interests cited by DOMA’s defenders as would be
typical in a rational basis review. Instead, the Court focused on the “design,
purpose, and effect of DOMA,” and held that the law’s “avowed purpose and
practical effect” was “to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a
stigma’ on same-sex couples that a state had permitted to wed. Because DOMA’s
‘principal purpose” was “to impose inequality,” the Court ruled that the law
deprived legally wed same-sex couples of “an essential part of the liberty
protected by the Fifth Amendment.”
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concern, the Court wrote, was triggered because DOMA was a “[d]iscrim-
ination[] of an unusual character.”185 In other words, it was the statute’s
“purpose and effect to disparage” same-sex couples that the Court found
troubling,186 with no reference to the decision’s implications for state
marriage laws. As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out in dissent, “[T]he
logic of [the Court’s] opinion does not decide[] the distinct question
whether the States, in the exercise of their ‘historic and essential
authority to define the marital relation,’ . . . may continue to utilize the
traditional definition of marriage.”187
VI. RISKY ARGUMENTS: SYNERGIES WITH INCREMENTAL ADVOCACY
One might reasonably conclude, in light of the discussion to this
point, that it is best for advocates to avoid or at least minimize reliance
on arguments that push judges to confront their naturalized assumptions
about social norms and practices. By limiting confrontations about sex
and gender roles in marriage cases, in particular, advocates might also
limit their risk of generating judicial discomfort and resistance. Likewise,
one might expect judges who agree with norm-challenging arguments to
set them aside in favor of others that their colleagues find easier to grasp.
Yet, at the same time, there are real costs to this approach.
This Part first looks closely at those costs and then evaluates whether
wins on more discrete, incremental arguments are really so different in
their effect from wins that rest on risky arguments. At least in connection
with gay-rights cases generally, and marriage cases more specifically, the
Supreme Court’s rulings on relatively discrete legal theories have proven
to be powerful in ways well beyond what the doctrinal terms would
suggest. This is not to say that winning marriage equality on a sex-
Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1208 (D. Utah 2013) (citations omitted)
(quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689, 2692–94, 2707), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, No. 14-124, 2014 WL 3841263 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014).
185. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (first alteration in original) (quoting Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Id. at 2696.
187. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). One might argue that this is precisely the sort of
minimalist ruling that the Court should reach, particularly when other related cases are in
the pipeline. See supra note 27 (examining why courts may favor minimalistic approach to
social-change cases); see also Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism
on the Supreme Court 4 (2001) (“Decisional minimalism . . . reduce[s] the burdens of
judicial decision . . . and more fundamentally, minimalism is likely to make judicial errors
less frequent and (above all) less damaging.”).
Further, one might argue that the sex-discrimination cases did not actually involve
discrimination of an unusual character so that that analytic framework would have been
an awkward fit there, while it does fit the gay-rights cases. But it can hardly be said that
legally enforced discrimination against gay people was unusual at the time of Romer or
even at the point when Windsor was decided; indeed, it is no secret, even to the Court, that
these forms of discrimination were—and with respect to marriage, remained at the time of
Windsor—pervasive in the United States. See, e.g., HRC Romer Brief, supra note 176, at *9–
*15 (describing “history of discrimination” against gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals).
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discrimination theory would not have been more powerful; to the con-
trary, the discussion of costs below suggests it likely would have been. But
the difference has not proven significant.
This observation prompts the third question explored below: How
have rulings on incremental grounds become so powerful while eliding
some of the challenges risky arguments bring? The last part of the
discussion then steps back to consider the synergies that are possible by
bringing together the conceptual force of risky arguments with the risk
minimization of more discrete approaches.
A. The Costs of Sidestepping the Sex-Discrimination Argument
Most basically, in the marriage-litigation context, the sex-
discrimination argument may be persuasive to some judges who are
otherwise not inclined to strike the different-sex couple requirement on
sexual-orientation-discrimination grounds.188 Surely it is a loss not to
make the argument in this circumstance.
But let us assume a judge is open to striking the exclusion of same-
sex couples from marriage on other grounds. In this case, how might it
matter if the sex-discrimination argument is not pressed? Three points
come to mind. First, the sex-discrimination argument helps to discredit
the usual justifications for the exclusion by shedding light on the sex
stereotypes embedded in them. For example, governments frequently
invoke children’s interests in having a male and a female parent or the
state’s interest in privileging “natural” procreation.189 Viewing these
rationales through the lens of a sex-discrimination argument can help
188. Although perhaps unlikely, a judge might be unwilling to recognize the
disparate impact of a rule that does not differentiate explicitly based on sexual
orientation. Cf. Latta v. Otter, Nos. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at
*15 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring) (“‘[S]exual orientation does not
appear as a qualification for marriage’ under these laws; sex does.” (quoting Baker v.
State, 1744 A.2d 864, 905 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part))).
This same judge might also believe that rational-basis review should apply to sexual-
orientation-based classifications but heightened scrutiny should apply to sex-based
classifications and that the proffered justifications for a different-sex marriage-eligibility
rule satisfy the former but fail the latter. Indeed, the U.S. government took the position
that DOMA failed heightened scrutiny but not rational-basis review. See U.S. Windsor
Merits Brief, supra note 182, at 52 (“The government has concluded that . . . DOMA
Section 3 cannot be sustained under [heightened scrutiny]. If the Court disagrees and
applies rational-basis review, the government . . . does not challenge the constitutionality
of Section 3 under that highly deferential standard.”).
189. See Brief of Appellants at 63–64, 83, Kitchen, 755 F.3d 1193 (No. 13-4178), 2014
WL 580550 (arguing “mother–father parenting” provides an essential contribution to
healthy child development and that the “need to ensure adequate procreation” explains
why “marriage has always been conceived as a union of a man and a woman for the purpose
of having children”); William C. Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage, 2 Ave Maria L.
Rev. 153, 154–60 (2004) (discussing justifications advanced for different-sex marriage rule
in litigation including procreation and child rearing).
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expose their impermissible assumptions about men and women’s roles;190
to omit the argument is to give up a potentially powerful analytic tool.
Second, the omission risks being read to signal advocates’ doubts
that gender stereotypes actually permeate the rationales often given for
excluding same-sex couples from marriage. Without that direct challenge
to the government’s mother–father preference and other similar justifi-
cations, a judicial reader might wonder whether the advocates accept
those rationales as legitimate even while maintaining their inadequacy.
Third, and perhaps most importantly for this Essay’s purposes, a win
on the sex-discrimination argument would arguably have a broader
impact than a win on a discrimination-of-an-unusual-character antitarget-
ing theory or even a win on a sexual-orientation-discrimination theory.
To the extent a court recognizes that sex stereotyping is integral to
sexual-orientation discrimination, the analysis should prompt height-
ened scrutiny of other instances of sexual-orientation discrimination,
even if the level of scrutiny for sexual-orientation-based classifications
remains undecided. In other words, if it is understood that treating gay
and nongay people differently effectuates sex stereotypes, it is difficult to
imagine a circumstance in which a court could sustain any antigay
discrimination.191
By contrast, a win on a sexual-orientation-discrimination theory in
the marriage context might not govern a case in which a school seeks to
exclude a gay–straight alliance.192 The marriage ruling would be influen-
tial, of course, but it would not be conclusive of that action’s invalidity in
the way that a decision recognizing the sex discrimination embedded in
different treatment based on sexual orientation arguably would be.193
Moreover, a win on a sex-stereotyping theory in the marriage
context might have carryover benefits to the few remaining areas in
190. See Widiss et al., supra note 32, at 463 (“Exposing the sex stereotypes at play . . .
discredit[s] the proffered rationalizations as insufficient to meet even ‘rational basis’
review.”); see also supra note 77 (discussing Judge Berzon’s recent rejection based on sex-
stereotyping jurisprudence of the argument that gender complementarity between parents
provides benefits).
191. See Widiss et al., supra note 32, at 489 (“[R]ecognizing that many of the
purported justifications for these [different-sex] requirements are largely or entirely based
on sex stereotypes makes clear that such justifications cannot be an appropriate basis for
government action, even if legislators and others sincerely believe in their validity.”).
192. Cf. Carver Middle Sch. Gay-Straight Alliance v. Sch. Bd., No. 5:13-CV-623-OC-
10PRL, 2014 WL 897072, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2014) (expressing skepticism about
plaintiffs’ challenge to school board’s nonrecognition of a gay–straight alliance). But see
Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Sch. Bd., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1267–69 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
(holding school board’s refusal to recognize gay–straight alliance violated students’ rights
under the Equal Access Act and First Amendment).
193. Cf. Latta v. Otter, Nos. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at *28
(9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring) (“Although the gender stereotyping so
typical of sex discrimination may be present [in discrimination directed expressly at
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals], those restrictions are better analyzed as sexual
orientation discrimination . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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which sex-discriminatory rules have been sustained. For example, if a
state is not permitted to presume that mothers and fathers play different
roles in a way that could justify restricting marriage to different-sex
couples, it may be more difficult for the government to sustain the
distinction between mothers and fathers in federal laws and policies that
impose extra burdens on fathers of foreign-born children in the
immigration context.194 Quite possibly, too, if the sex stereotyping in
marriage becomes more apparent, the sex stereotyping present in
grooming codes would become more visible and less tolerable as well.195
B. The High Impact of Discrete-Argument Wins in Marriage Cases
Notwithstanding these potential costs, a ruling that strikes a discrimi-
natory law on a relatively discrete argument may engender legal and
societal change in ways similar to one that expressly rejects deep-rooted
stereotypes. In the marriage context, this means that a judicial decision
need not directly recognize and disavow the sex stereotypes embedded in
a different-sex marriage rule to have an impact, both legally and socially,
on those stereotypes’ validity. As a result, the costs of not making the
argument may be somewhat diminished.
The marriage rulings following United States v. Windsor illustrate the
point. Winning DOMA’s invalidation on a discrimination-of-an-unusual-
character theory did not necessarily decide the question whether states
could continue to exclude same-sex couples from marriage.196 If Windsor
194. To be fair, it is not clear that a sex-discrimination win in marriage would have
resulted in a different outcome in Nguyen, because the majority found that the different
rules were justified in part by men’s and women’s distinct relationships to the foreign-born
child’s birth. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (highlighting rule’s connection to
“our most basic biological differences—such as the fact that a mother must be present at
birth but the father need not be”). Further, the Nguyen concurrence turned on the
plenary authority of Congress in matters of immigration and sovereignty. Id. at 73–74
(Scalia, J., concurring).
Still, a strong sex-stereotyping decision could potentially add more weight to
arguments about the sex-role expectations that flow from biological differences. See id. at
83–94 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority’s reasoning regarding the
likelihood of mother and father to develop relationship with child because of presence at
birth rested on “overbroad sex-based generalization”); cf. Katherine M. Franke, The
Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 98 (1995) (arguing that “biology is both a wrong and dangerous place to
ground antidiscrimination law because it fails to account for the manner in which every
sexual biological fact is meaningful only within a gendered frame of reference”).
195. Again, a sex-discrimination win in the marriage context may not necessarily
carry over for a range of reasons, including that deference to private employers’
decisionmaking vis-à-vis their workplaces arguably plays a significant role in the grooming
cases. See supra note 143 (discussing cases in which workplace grooming- and dress-code
policies were upheld or struck down); cf. Greene, What Not to Wear, supra note 171, at
351 (discussing deference courts give to employers concerning grooming- and dress-code
policies).
196. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority opinion, but arguing that scope of the holding
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had invalidated DOMA on a sex-discrimination theory, or on a theory
that sexual-orientation discrimination warrants heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause, it would be harder for states to distin-
guish and protect their exclusionary marriage laws against invalidation.197
Yet, in the wake of a post-Windsor flood of rulings striking down state
bans on same-sex couples’ marriages, the broad reach of Windsor’s doc-
trine, which might have been cabined as just described, became appar-
ent. Dozens of courts, in all parts of the country, with both liberal and
conservative judges, had little difficulty finding that marriage exclusions
violated gay couples’ constitutional rights.198
was narrow and did not determine whether states “may continue to utilize the traditional
definition of marriage”). But see Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d
1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (“Supreme Court law now prohibits states from passing laws
that are born of animosity against homosexuals . . . . There is no precise legal label for
what has occurred . . . beginning with Romer in 1996 and culminating in Windsor in 2013,
but this Court knows a rhetorical shift when it sees one.”); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F.
Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (D. Utah 2013) (“The court agrees with Justice Scalia’s interpretation
of Windsor and finds that the important federalism concerns at issue here are nevertheless
insufficient to save a state-law prohibition that denies the Plaintiffs their rights to due
process and equal protection under the law.”), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, No. 14-124, 2014 WL 3841263 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014).
197. Illustrating this point is Nevada’s decision to stop defending the state’s
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage following a Ninth Circuit ruling that sexual-
orientation discrimination warrants heightened scrutiny. See Smithkline Beecham Corp. v.
Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Windsor established a level of scrutiny for
classifications based on sexual orientation that is unquestionably higher than rational basis
review. In other words, Windsor requires that heightened scrutiny be applied to equal
protection claims involving sexual orientation.”). After defending Nevada’s marriage
exclusion in a different case before the district court, the state’s Republican governor
commented, in light of the Ninth Circuit’s heightened-scrutiny ruling, that “[i]t has
become clear that this case is no longer defensible in court.” Gay Marriage Ban Support
Slips in Nevada, N.Y. Times (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/us/
gay-marriage-ban-support-slips-in-nevada.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
198. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 672 (7th Cir.) (striking down state
restrictions on same-sex couples’ marriages), cert. denied, No. 14-277, 2014 WL 4425162
(U.S. Oct. 6, 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
No. 14-225, 2014 WL 4230092 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1074
(10th Cir. 2014) (same); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229–30 (10th Cir. 2014)
(same); Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 550 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (same); Whitewood v.
Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (same); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp.
2d 1128, 1146–48 (D. Or. 2014) (same); Latta v. Otter, No. 1:13-cv-00482-CWD, 2014 WL
1909999, at *28–*29 (D. Idaho May 13) (same), aff’d, No. 14-35420, 2014 WL 4977682
(9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014); Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-cv-129, 2014 WL 1418395, at *18 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 14, 2014) (same); DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich.)
(same), rev’d, No. 14-1341, 2014 WL 5748990 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014), available at http://
sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/6th-CA-marriage-ruling-11-6-14.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 666
(W.D. Tex. 2014) (same); Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 2014 WL 683680, at *1–*2 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 21, 2014) (same); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 997–98 (S.D. Ohio
2013) (same), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer, 2014 WL 5748990; Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865,
889 (N.M. 2013) (same); see also Tanco v. Haslam, No. 3:13-CV-01159, 2014 WL 997525,
at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer, 2014 WL 5748990 (issuing
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This was the case notwithstanding Chief Justice Roberts’s effort, in
dissent, to highlight an additional doctrinal path by which lower courts
could distinguish Windsor in future state-law challenges. While Roberts
urged that states’ freedom to block gay couples from marrying should
remain unaffected by the majority’s rebuke of the federal DOMA,199 not
a single court in the first year after Windsor was decided took him up on
that invitation.200
A similar phenomenon occurred following the Court’s rulings in
Romer and Lawrence. After each of those decisions, the willingness of
lower courts to invalidate antigay laws increased exponentially even
though Romer turned on a discrimination-of-an-unusual-character theory,
and Lawrence focused its holding on the states’ violation of gay people’s
liberty interests in their intimate relationships.201 To be sure, had the
Court decided either case on a sex-discrimination theory, or even a
sexual-orientation-discrimination theory, the numerous courts that dis-
tinguished Romer and Lawrence when rejecting marriage-equality claims
would have had a more difficult time doing so.202 Yet, although the Court
preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of Tennessee marriage-recognition ban).
For a complete list of decisions in marriage cases post-Windsor, see Marriage Litigation,
Freedom to Marry, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/litigation (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
199. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
200. Justice Scalia arguably predicted this result, writing, in dissent, that “[b]y
formally declaring anyone opposed to same-sex marriage an enemy of human decency,
the majority arms well every challenger to a state law restricting marriage to its traditional
definition.” Id. at 2710 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201. See, e.g., Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 929
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (striking down “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”), vacated as moot, 658 F.3d 1162
(9th Cir. 2011); Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1002, 1004
(D. Neb. 2005) (citing Romer while striking down a Nebraska constitutional amendment
denying recognition of same-sex civil unions, domestic partnerships, and similar same-sex
relationships), rev’d sub nom. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir.
2006); Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 353–54 (Ark. 2002) (striking down Arkansas
sodomy statute because it served no rational purpose and violated Arkansas’s equal-
protection guarantee); Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d
79, 91–92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that Florida’s categorical exclusion of gay
people from adopting served no rational purpose and violated Florida’s equal-protection
guarantee); State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 40–41 (Kan. 2005) (concluding Kansas’s “Romeo
and Juliet” law violated the Equal Protection Clause by imposing different penalties for
consensual sexual acts between same- and different-sex couples); Goodridge v. Dep’t of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948, 962, 969 (Mass. 2003) (citing both Romer and Lawrence
to conclude that “barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of
civil marriage solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the
Massachusetts Constitution”).
202. See, e.g., Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1092 (D. Haw. 2012)
(“In contrast to Amendment 2 in Romer, Hawaii’s marriage laws are not so unusual or
unduly broad that they are ‘inexplicable by anything but animus’ towards same-sex
couples.” (citation omitted)), vacated as moot, No. 12-16995, 2014 WL 5088199 (9th Cir.
Oct. 10, 2014); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306–08 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (concluding
that the “Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence cannot be interpreted as creating a
fundamental right to same-sex marriage” or as requiring heightened scrutiny for sexual-
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expressly sidestepped the marriage question in Lawrence203 and did not
mention marriage at all in Romer, its decisions in those cases infused
many lower-court rulings granting marriage-equality claims.204
C. Theorizing the Power of Discrete Arguments in Social-Change Litigation
It is not necessarily obvious why Windsor (or Lawrence and Romer)
had such strong ripple effects given their arguably limited doctrinal
holdings. The discrimination-of-an-unusual-character rationale is keyed
to a challenged law’s distinctiveness; by design, it will not necessarily
carry far beyond the invalidated measure.205 Still, narrowly written
orientation discrimination (citation omitted)); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 140 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 2004) (rejecting federal DOMA challenge and observing that “Lawrence
holding does not require a change in the federal statutory approach to marriage”);
Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding Arizona’s
marriage laws and claiming that, unlike Colorado’s ban on antidiscrimination protections
for gay people, Arizona’s laws “are not so exceptional and unduly broad as to render the
State’s reasons for their enactment ‘inexplicable by anything but animus’ towards
Arizona’s homosexual residents” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996))); In
re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 680 (Tex. App. 2010) (citing Romer Court’s focus on
animus and concluding “Texas’s laws governing marriage and divorce, by contrast, are
rationally related to the legitimate state interest in fostering the best possible environment
for procreation and child-raising” and “Romer and Lawrence are distinguishable and
offer . . . no support” for marriage-equality argument).
203. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (stating that the challenge to
Texas’s “homosexual conduct” law “does not involve whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter”). Justice
O’Connor took the same position in her equal-protection-focused concurrence. See id. at
585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“That this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause does not mean that other laws
distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail under rational
basis review.”).
204. See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing
Lawrence for the proposition that tradition was an insufficient basis for sustaining the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage and citing Romer’s rejection of animus
toward the “class of persons affected” as support for invalidating Proposition 8’s singular
burden on gay people seeking to marry), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[S]peaking directly of same-sex preferences, Lawrence
ruled that moral disapproval alone cannot justify legislation discriminating on this basis.
Moral judgments can hardly be avoided in legislation, but Lawrence and Romer have
undercut this basis.” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013); Windsor v.
United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Lawrence and Romer to
distinguish between laws requiring rational-basis analysis and “‘law[s that] exhibit[] . . . a
desire to harm a politically unpopular group,’ which receive ‘a more searching form of
rational basis review . . . under the Equal Protection Clause’” (alterations in original)
(quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring))), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d
Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
205. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., for example, the Court rejected
a zoning ordinance that burdened people with intellectual disabilities because fear and
“mere negative attitudes” were not legitimate bases for government action. 473 U.S. 432,
448 (1985). But this analysis did not lead the Court to reject a law that imposed relatively
burdensome involuntary civil commitment rules on people with intellectual disabilities,
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opinions have the potential for relatively high impact for two reasons I
explore here, again using the marriage cases, along with others, to
illustrate.
1. Building on Preexisting Norm Destabilization. — First, a ruling that
strikes down a legislative or initiated measure for being a discrimination
of an unusual character itself reflects—and capitalizes on—preexisting
changes to hostile social norms regarding the relevant community. A
court can conclude that a law’s negative treatment of a social group is
both unusual and impermissible only after the challenged discrimination
is no longer widely seen as part of the natural order; until that time, the
argument that the law is either unusual or discriminatory will have little
plausibility. In other words, if it were still an accepted social practice to
discriminate against that group, the law at issue would not be so
troubling.
The Court’s notorious 1986 ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick helps
illustrate the point.206 There, while upholding Georgia’s sodomy law
against a challenge by a gay man arrested in his own bedroom for engag-
ing in consensual oral sex, the Court deemed the man’s privacy claim as
“at best, facetious.”207 Neither Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
nor much of the surrounding society had reached the point where
discrimination against gay people could easily be condemned for its
unusual character.208 This made it particularly striking when the Court in
notwithstanding arguments that similar impermissible motives were present. See Heller v.
Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993) (finding “more than adequate justifications for
the differences in treatment between the mentally retarded and the mentally ill”); id. at
348 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Kentucky is being allowed to draw a distinction that is
difficult to see as resting on anything other than the stereotypical assumption that the
retarded are ‘perpetual children,’ an assumption that has historically been taken to justify
the disrespect and ‘grotesque mistreatment’ to which the retarded have been subjected.”).
206. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
207. Id. at 194.
208. On the damaging ripple effects of Bowers v. Hardwick, both legally and socially,
see, e.g., Mary C. Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians Down by Law in the 1990’s USA: The
Continuing Toll of Bowers v. Hardwick, 24 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
The Court arguably misjudged popular sentiment in Bowers, at least with respect to
the legitimacy of sodomy laws. The ruling provoked widespread opposition and nearly
universal condemnation by legal academics. See, e.g., Anne B. Goldstein, History,
Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 97 Yale L.J. 1073, 1087 (1988) (describing “majority’s use of the concept of
homosexuality” as “flawed”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737,
739 (1989) (asserting that “Hardwick has exposed deep flaws in the prevailing
jurisprudence and ideology of privacy”); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick:
Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 648, 656 (1987) (“Bowers v.
Hardwick is, fundamentally, lawmaking by personal predilection—precisely the sort of
judicial self-indulgence that the critics of the Warren Court most often decry. It is a
cavalier decision, without reference to either standard or principle and in blatant
disregard of well-settled procedural rules.”); Joseph Robert Thornton, Bowers v. Hardwick:
An Incomplete Constitutional Analysis, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 1100, 1122 (1987) (“[T]he
[Bowers] opinion reads as if the majority made up its mind to deny homosexuals
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Lawrence declared that “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and
it is not correct today.”209
In fact, it took a decade for the norm of antigay discrimination to
become sufficiently destabilized so that a majority of the Court could find
flaws in a ban on discrimination protections for gay people that it could
not see in Georgia’s arrest of Mr. Hardwick.210 Rejecting Justice Scalia’s
insistence in dissent that the Court had taken sides in a kulturkampf,211
the Romer majority deemed “implausible” the state’s claim that the
amendment permissibly denied only “special rights.”212 The Court (two-
thirds of the Court, really) could see, moreover, that the discrimination
at issue was of an unusual character and that the amendment’s targeting
of gay people was “not within our constitutional tradition.”213
This response to surrounding social change can be seen in the
Windsor ruling as well; seventeen years after Romer, the same
discrimination-of-an-unusual-character argument was now plausible in
the marriage context. If it were still the norm for governments to
discriminate openly against gay people, the Court in Windsor would not
have been so troubled by the federal government’s decision to reject a
subset of marriages that states had chosen to sanctify.214 The Court’s
constitutional protection, then applied whatever law and tradition supported its position
and ignored all authority and arguments to the contrary.”); Timothy W. Reinig, Comment,
Sin, Stigma & Society: A Critique of Morality and Values in Democratic Law and Policy, 38
Buff. L. Rev. 859, 862 (1990) (“Prejudice, rather than sound legal argument, seems to be
the basis for the result in Hardwick.”).
209. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
210. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In the preceding term, the Court
ruled unanimously against an organization of gay Irish individuals that wanted to
participate in Boston’s Saint Patrick’s parade, but its decision was a notable prelude to
Romer because of the shift in tone. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995). While the gay litigants lost, the Court’s opinion did not
emanate the discomfort or hostility that characterized the Bowers decision or even the
mildly written “gay Olympics” decision that came a year after Bowers. Id. (“Our holding
today rests not on any particular view about the Council’s message but on the Nation’s
commitment to protect freedom of speech.”); see also S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542 (1987) (upholding the U.S. Olympic Committee’s
objection to the use of “Olympics” associated with sporting events featuring gay athletes
notwithstanding widespread use of “Olympics” by other competitions).
211. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 626.
213. Id. at 633 (citation omitted). The Court quite deliberately tied its analysis to
broader American traditions by beginning its opinion with Justice Harlan’s century-old
Plessy dissent for the proposition that the law must be “neutral[] where the rights of
persons are at stake.” Id. at 623.
214. Presumably, this foundation of social change, including the years of effort to lay
the groundwork for these changes, see, e.g., Mary Bonauto & James Esseks, Marriage
Equality Advocacy from the Trenches, 29 Colum. J. Gender & L. (forthcoming 2015)
(describing early years of marriage-equality advocacy), helps explain why the backlash that
some anticipated in response to marriage litigation has not materialized in a significant
way. Cf. Michael J. Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and the
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concern about DOMA’s demeaning of same-sex couples and their
children215 likewise would not have made sense in a jurisprudential—or
social—world in which disfavoring gay people was widely permitted.216
Indeed, the Court’s opinion expressly acknowledged these external
changes in a range of ways, including in characterizing New York’s
decision to recognize same-sex couples’ marriages as an effort “to
eliminate inequality.”217 In this way, and by invoking states’ commitment
to equality, the Court framed its analysis as continuing, rather than
breaking with, tradition.218
In this sense, an incremental argument such as “discrimination of an
unusual character” does not ask the court to break new conceptual
ground like a risky argument might. Instead, it deliberately asks the court
to apply a well-settled analysis—to find that “[i]t is not within our
constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort,” as the Court wrote in
Romer.219 Put simply, the context may be new but the concept is not.
2. Solidifying and Amplifying Preexisting Changes in Public Discourse and
Related Jurisprudence. — Second, even assuming the narrowly written
rulings focused on here reflect preexisting changes, as just described,
judicial ratification almost certainly also solidifies and amplifies those
changes both in public discourse and in later cases.220
Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage 166–69 (2013) (discussing history of backlash against
marriage litigation).
215. The Court in Windsor observed that the federal government’s disregard of same-
sex couples’ marriages “humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by
same-sex couples. The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children to
understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other
families in their community and in their daily lives.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2694 (2013).
216. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 Mich. L.
Rev. 2596, 2606 (2003) (“[J]udicial decisions rest within a range of acceptability to a
majority of the people.”); see also Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer’s Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 269, 272 (1993) (“Mr. Dooley’s dictum about the Supreme Court’s tendency to
follow the election returns seems no less apt today than when it was first printed almost a
century ago.”). Fittingly, given the theory advanced here, the U.S. Supreme Court did not
even issue an opinion to accompany its first-ever invalidation of an antigay act in 1958. See
One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371, 371 (1958) (per curiam), rev’g 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1957). Instead, the Court, per curiam, summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
determination that a gay-oriented magazine could be deemed “nonmailable” by the
postmaster of Los Angeles because of its content. Id. An opinion would have required the
Court to explain why articles written about gay people were not necessarily obscene under
federal law, a difficult task in the 1950s.
217. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
218. The same can be said of the Court’s choice to tie DOMA’s violation of
antitargeting principles not only to the measure invalidated in Romer but also to the forty-
year-old ruling in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno rejecting a law that had no purpose
other than to harm its unpopular targets. Id. at 2693 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)).
219. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
220. See also Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution, supra note 1, at 8 (“[C]onstitu-
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Turning to public discourse first, it should not be a controversial
proposition that high-visibility coverage has put legal decisions in a
position to influence public discussion of marriage and related issues.221
The very nature of legal rulings also enhances their power; while elected
officials and prominent political and cultural leaders have an impact on
popular discourse through their statements and conduct, judges actually
decide questions and, as such, are distinctly authoritative.222 Their
decisions have real-world consequences, at least when they are final, and
thus necessarily become a touchstone for future public debate.
Moreover, because case outcomes become known to the public
through media headlines and sound-bite coverage, decisions’ ration-
ales—including the choice of a narrow theory over a norm-challenging
one—tend to have little public exposure or impact relative to the final
judgment. As Paul Gewirtz once observed in a different context, “[I]t is
possible that the manner in which a court justifies a particular remedy
will make no dignitary difference at all. We who live by the lamp may
exaggerate the importance of words.”223
Still, judges surely pay attention to their colleagues’ opinions, so the
relatively unnuanced public depiction of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Windsor, for example, cannot alone explain why so many lower courts
relied on Windsor to strike state marriage bans. That coverage, however,
along with news about the growing number of states that recognized
marriage equality legislatively while Windsor was pending,224 presumably
tional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture.”).
221. For discussions of the impact of court rulings on public discourse generally, see,
e.g., Patrick J. Egan et al., Gay Rights, in Public Opinion and Constitutional Controversy
234, 239–45 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (examining evidence suggesting Supreme
Court’s agenda-setting role affects public opinion, rather than vice versa). But see Stephen
B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court
Justices, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1511, 1527–28 (2006) (describing limited public attention
given to judicial opinions). For analysis of the extensive media coverage of marriage cases,
see generally Nathaniel Persily, Gay Marriage, Public Opinion, and the Courts (Penn Law
Legal Scholarship Repository, Faculty Scholarship, Paper No. 91, 2006), available at
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/91 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
222. Arguably, a judicially sanctioned outcome has a unique type of legitimacy
because it “bear[s] witness that it was reached through the discipline of the pattern of the
law.” Edward H. Levi, The Nature of Judicial Reasoning, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 395, 409
(1965).
223. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585, 669 (1983); cf. Vicki C.
Jackson, Constitutions as “Living Trees”? Comparative Constitutional Law and Interpretive
Metaphors, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 921, 940 n.78 (2006) (“Although the literature suggests
low public attention to the reasoning of most judicial opinions, mass media on occasion
devotes time to legal reasoning in ways that may affect general impressions of the
legitimacy of the courts’ work.” (citations omitted)).
224. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Weighs Cases Redefining Legal Equality,
N.Y. Times (June 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/us/supreme-court-
weighs-cases-redefining-legal-equality.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“In the
three months since . . . [the Windsor] argument, three more states have adopted same-sex
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prompted further shifts in public opinion.225 And these shifts, in turn,
shaped the landscape in which courts were hearing marriage-equality
cases after the Windsor term ended.
Emblematic were statements from national media, such as TIME,
which declared that “gay marriage” had already won.226 To stand against
what appeared to be a sweeping wave of change, while not unimaginable,
would now pose its own risks to judicial legitimacy.227 After the first courts
marriage, raising the total to 12, along with the District of Columbia.”); Dorothy J.
Samuels, And Then There Were Ten, N.Y. Times: Taking Note (Apr. 26, 2013, 10:28 AM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/and-then-there-were-ten/ (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (“Rhode Island’s advance adds to the building sense of
momentum for marriage equality.”).
225. See, e.g., Jon Cohen, Gay Marriage Support Hits New High in Post–ABC Poll,
Wash. Post: The Fix (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2013/03/18/gay-marriage-support-hits-new-high-in-post-abc-poll (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (observing recent increase in percentage of Americans who support
marriage equality); Micah Cohen, Poll Finds Record Support for Same-Sex Marriage in
California, N.Y. Times: FiveThirtyEight (Mar. 1, 2013, 4:43 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.
blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/poll-finds-record-support-for-same-sex-marriage-in-califor
nia (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing dramatic increase in support for
marriage equality in California since 2008 approval of Proposition 8).
226. TIME had this message on its cover even before Windsor was decided. TIME
(Apr. 8, 2013), available at http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20130408,00.
html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Even conservative talk-show host Rush
Limbaugh conceded that marriage equality was inevitable and that opponents had lost on
the issue. Aaron Blake, Rush Limbaugh: Gay Marriage ‘Inevitable,’ Conservatives ‘Lost,’
Wash. Post (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/
2013/03/28/rush-limbaugh-gay-marriage-inevitable-conservatives-lost (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
LGBT advocacy groups made efforts to limit the sense of marriage-equality efforts
being completed given that most states, even a year after Windsor, continued to exclude
same-sex couples from marriage. See, e.g., Press Release, Freedom to Marry, One Year
After Windsor Ruling: Momentum for the Freedom to Marry Reaches Record Highs (June
25, 2014), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/press/press-release/one-year-after-historic-
windsor-ruling-momentum-for-the-freedom-to-marry (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“Same-sex couples are still denied the freedom to marry in 31 states where 56
percent of the country resides. Yet twenty federal and state judges have ruled this
discrimination unconstitutional in whole or in part in the past year. The inequity is
stark.”).
227. See Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics 190 (1989) (“[T]he views of a
majority of the justices of the Supreme Court are never out of line for very long with the
views prevailing among the lawmaking majorities of the country.”); Robert G. McCloskey,
The American Supreme Court 260 (Daniel J. Boorstin ed., 5th ed. 2010) (“[I]t is hard to
find a single historical instance when the Court has stood firm for very long against a really
clear wave of public demand.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution,
118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1833 (2005) (“Justices who defy aroused public opinion . . . know
that they risk[] provoking a political backlash that ultimately could cause their doctrinal
handiwork to collapse. Possibly as a result of the Court’s concern for its own sociological
legitimacy, it has seldom remained dramatically at odds with aroused public opinion . . . .”
(footnote omitted)); Friedman, supra note 220, at 2611–13 (underscoring “[j]udges do
not live in a cocoon” and “face [an incentive] to remain within the range of public
opinion”).
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to rule in Windsor’s wake ruled in favor of marriage equality, the risks
arguably became even greater, particularly as the rulings were lauded at
the highest levels of government,228 elicited bipartisan support,229 and
came in states not thought to be especially friendly to gay-rights claims of
this sort.230
In this way, Windsor’s discrimination-of-an-unusual-character analysis
was not only solidified but also amplified—with hydraulic effects—by
both the media and lower courts.
D. Retaining a Role for Risky Arguments
Risky arguments might seem to be almost irrelevant given that
incremental legal theories can both gain traction and elide the
downsides of their norm-challenging counterparts. But this conclusion
would miss two significant roles that risky arguments likely play in
decisionmaking.
First, as discussed earlier, risky arguments might have a particular
ability to illuminate defects in a challenged law precisely because they
focus attention on problematic underlying norms. In the marriage cases,
for example, the sex-discrimination argument seems to present the
clearest frame from which to challenge governments’ proffered justifica-
tion that children need male–female couples as parents because of the
differences between mothers and fathers.231
228. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Remarks by the President
at Pride Month Celebration (June 30, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2014/06/30/remarks-president-pride-month-celebration (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“Same-sex marriage has gone into effect in 10 more states—(applause)—which
means that 43 percent of Americans now live in states where you’re free to marry who you
love.”).
229. See Erik Eckholm, Republicans from the West Give Support for Gay Marriage,
N.Y. Times (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/us/republicans-from-
west-give-support-for-gay-marriage.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Evoking
Ronald Reagan and Barry Goldwater, a group of Western-state Republicans plans to enter
the battle in favor of same-sex marriage on Tuesday, urging a federal appeals court to
declare gay marriage bans in Utah and Oklahoma unconstitutional.”).
230. See, e.g., De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 662 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (holding
Texas’s marriage bans violate plaintiffs’ due-process rights); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp.
2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va.) (striking down Virginia’s marriage bans for violating plaintiffs’ due-
process and equal-protection rights), aff’d sub nom. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, No. 14-225, 2014 WL 4230092 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert,
961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2013) (striking down Utah’s marriage bans for
violating plaintiffs’ due-process and equal-protection rights), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, No. 14-124, 2014 WL 3841263 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014). Notably, some of the
early post-Windsor cases also presented highly compelling facts, including one couple who
took an air-ambulance flight to another state so they could be married shortly before one
member of the couple died. See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 (S.D.
Ohio 2013), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341, 2014 WL 5748990 (6th Cir.
Nov. 6, 2014), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/
11/6th-CA-marriage-ruling-11-6-14.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
231. See Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 32, at 1225 (calling the
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Second, legal claims and theories have an expressive function within
litigation in addition to providing a doctrinal path toward a desired
outcome.232 While the expressive function of factual allegations in
complaints has received some attention,233 and the expressive function of
legal theory much more,234 this role of legal theory within litigation
warrants consideration as well.
More specifically, like any other type of case, social-change cases
typically can be argued based on a range of theories, and advocates must
be strategic about which theories to advance, in what order, and at what
length. But even with those questions decided, the individual arguments
do not operate in standalone fashion. Instead, they have their own
ecology, each affecting the reception of the others and all together creat-
ing synergies arising from their unique contributions.235
hypothetical rationale offered by legislatures that children are better off being raised by a
mother and a father than by same-sex partners “deeply disturbing”); Widiss et al., supra
note 32, at 490 (“[C]ourts in the marriage cases have fallen back on an essentialized
understanding of gender roles to hold that legislatures may assume that children do best
with a ‘mother’ and a ‘father’ and that male and female parents, simply by virtue of their
sex, play significantly different roles for their children.”).
232. Some have compared the expressive role of legal theory to its determinative
role, observing that theory “cannot tell us what to value, but it can help us (judges,
scholars, citizens) make choices by helping us to articulate what we value.” Joseph William
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.J. 1, 63 (1984).
Others have focused on the expressive function of law as it relates to human behavior. See,
e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 1–2 (2000) (cataloguing diverse ways in which
legal intervention can influence or change social norms); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2025–29 (1996) (“[M]y principal aim
is to defend laws that attempt to alter norms, rather than laws that merely ‘speak.’”). Still
others have addressed the expressive function of litigation itself.
Consolidating many of these ideas, Paul Stephan wrote:
As a matter of legal theory, there exist many ways to capture the
expressive function of litigation. Those of us who work in law and
economics might say that litigation generates public goods in the form of
more and better information about the scope and meaning of legal rules.
Those interested in theories of justice might say that litigation engages
society in reasoned deliberation that allows society to better articulate its
sense of moral value. Those with a post-modern inclination might argue
that litigation serves as a kind of performance through which social
meaning is constructed. A common thread underlies each of these
otherwise disparate conceptions: litigation has purposes and functions that
are independent of the parties before the court. Judges and lawyers
engaged in litigation represent society, whether self-consciously or not, and
society in turn shapes and places its demands on those actors.
Paul Stephan, A Becoming Modesty—U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of International Law,
52 DePaul L. Rev. 627, 644–45 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
233. See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 39, at 766 (describing how moral outrage is often
lost in facts of civil-rights complaints).
234. See supra note 232 (discussing expressive role of legal theory relative to theory’s
determinative role).
235. A basic principle of ecology stresses the interconnections and synergies among
parts of the same system. See Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life: A New Scientific
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While risky arguments have a norm-confronting style that may make
them less likely to be embraced by a court, their clarity about underlying
problems might help generate or affirm a decisionmaker’s sense that
something is troubling about the measure at issue. Then, if the decision-
maker is not prepared, either intellectually or as a matter of practice, to
engage with the problem on those terms, other, more discrete arguments
might gain in appeal because they are easier to grasp or seem less
broadly impactful, or both.
In other words, in the ecology of social-change litigation, risky and
discrete arguments may interact synergistically, with the risky argument
destabilizing the challenged law and the discrete argument offering an
easier path to decision. This is not unlike the process that occurred in
the early marriage cases, where several courts brought themselves to the
point of recognizing the constitutional flaws embedded in states’ exclu-
sion of same-sex couples from marriage, but were reluctant to follow that
conclusion through by requiring marriage access as a remedy. In
Vermont, for example, the state supreme court found that the state had
violated same-sex couples’ rights under the state constitution’s Common
Benefits Clause, but it allowed the legislature to grant civil unions as a
remedy.236 Several years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court did essen-
tially the same thing, finding that exclusion from marriage violated same-
sex couples’ equality rights, but allowing the state legislature to provide
civil unions as a remedy.237
In these cases, the alternate remedy of civil unions arguably served a
function analogous to that of the discrete discrimination-of-an-unusual-
character theory in Windsor. It allowed for required change without
committing the courts to a full-on engagement with the norms their
decisions challenged. And, likewise, the decisions in Vermont and New
Jersey ultimately paved the way for later determinations, either by the
legislature or the court, to require marriage.238
These moves could be described as minimalist239 and also as consis-
tent with William Eskridge’s “jurisprudence of tolerance,” through which
courts—and in particular the Supreme Court—are committed to
Understanding of Living Systems 297–304 (1996) (“All members of an ecological
community are interconnected in a vast and intricate network of relationships, the web of
life. They derive their essential properties and, in fact, their very existence from their
relationships to other things.”).
236. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 888–89 (Vt. 1999).
237. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006); see also 2006 N.J. Laws 975 (“It is
the intent of the Legislature to comply with the constitutional mandate set forth by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in the recent landmark decision of Lewis v. Harris . . . .”)
238. See 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 33 (“The purpose of this act [creating civil unions]
is to recognize legal equality in the civil marriage laws . . . .”); Garden State Equal. v. Dow,
82 A.3d 336, 367–68 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2013) (“The equality demanded by Lewis now
requires that same-sex couples in New Jersey be allowed to marry.”).
239. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (exploring Sunstein’s theory of
judicial minimalism).
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“lowering the stakes of identity politics” by issuing marriage rulings only
to the extent the “country is [] willing to go along.”240
But without the claim for marriage—that full-on demand for social
change—it is hard to imagine that civil unions would have been so easily
embraced as a statewide mechanism for recognizing same-sex couples’
relationships. Put simply, as is often the case in politics and at times in
constitutional interpretation, the arguments at the margins help gener-
ate buy-in for arguments that appear to be more middle of the road.241
The remaining question here is a normative one: Who should take
the risk of making risky arguments, given their synergistic contributions?
In any given case, it might seem reasonable for the party litigating a case
to make all arguments, from discrete to risky, to maximize the potential
synergies among them. While page and attention limits are not endless,
as noted earlier, a party that groups the arguments together can invoke
their collective power, and then concentrate its resources on the theories
most likely to succeed and leave it to amici to reinforce and develop the
others.
On the other hand, risky arguments can sometimes trigger dormant
opposition, as was also discussed at the outset. From this vantage point, it
may be better for amici to advance arguments that set an outer bound
and shape the context in which other claims are heard and have the
party stay away from them altogether. That approach also minimizes the
reputational consequences for the party to the extent an argument risks
being seen as implausible. It also reduces the chance that a judge will
reach out specifically to reject the argument even while issuing a favor-
able ruling.
It would be folly to make a strong recommendation of either strategy
from the pages of a law-review essay, abstracted from the circumstances
of a particular case. Instead, the takeaway point, for litigation as well as
theory, is the inevitability of choice—and risk—and the absence of abso-
lute answers.
240. William N. Eskridge, Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to
Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1021, 1025–26 (2004). For
commentary on and a critique of this theory as it relates to Lawrence, see Jamal Greene,
Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 Yale L.J. 1862, 1882–83 (2006)
(arguing that Lawrence “does not source its emerging awareness within the gay rights
movement” but rather “alters the criteria upon which putatively protected expressive
conduct is to be formally judged”).
241. For discussion of the ways in which the terrain of “acceptable” argument shifts
by virtue of arguments made on both sides, see Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note
11, at 1330–32 (explaining, through the Equal Rights Amendment’s history, “how
American constitutional culture enables creative new claims about the Constitution’s
meaning” and how “proposed understandings ultimately assume a form in which they can
be integrated into the tradition they challenge”); see also Siegel, Equality Talk, supra note
135, at 1476 (discussing shifts in meaning of Brown v. Board of Education resulting from
changes in social-movement strategies supportive of and adverse to the decision).
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CONCLUSION
The presence of norm-challenging arguments in social-justice cases
can call attention to deep problems that underlie a challenged law. In
this way, the sex-discrimination argument arguably has contributed to
decisionmakers’ understanding of marriage bans’ deficits, even when
judicial opinions do not rely on it.
At the same time, rulings that rest on narrower arguments may also
be capable of undermining troubling norms without some of the risks
posed by arguments that directly and sometimes uncomfortably chal-
lenge settled views. Pro-marriage-equality rulings, for example, have nar-
rowed the scope of permissible discrimination based on sex even without
engaging the sex-discrimination argument.
Put more generally, norm-challenging arguments have valuable
synergies with—and may lay the groundwork for—the more incremental
arguments that most judges are inclined to adopt. In this light, rulings
allowing marriage for same-sex couples can be understood to acknow-
ledge that, contra Justice Bradley’s opinion in Bradwell, society will
survive even if the law is disempowered once more from enforcing sex
roles. More generally, narrow victories in social-change cases may rein-
force that the world will go on and thrive, even as the traditional, though
unmentioned, underpinnings of discriminatory rules give way.
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